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ABSTRACT 
 
EFFECTS OF THE CUSTOMS UNION ON THE PATTERNS OF TURKEY’S TRADE  
 
WITH THE WORLD: A PANEL ANALYSIS 
 
Üngör, Murat 
 
Master of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı 
 
November, 2003 
 
 
In this thesis, the effects of the Customs Union with the EU are analyzed for the case 
of Turkey, using unbalanced panel data sets consisting of more than 150 countries between 
1980-2001. Liberalization of Turkish foreign trade has gained an irrevocable momentum with 
the realization of substantial adjustments to the Common Custom Tariff System with the 
European Union (EU). On 6 March 1995, the European Union and Turkey signed agreement 
on Customs Union (CU). Turkey’s tariffs and levies on imports of manufactured products 
from the European Union were eliminated by this agreement. Our empirical analysis involves 
estimating the effects on exports and imports of Turkey of the Customs Union Agreement 
(CUA), of changes in price, and income, and of economic crises, controlling for additional 
institutional variables.  Our results indicate that the CUA has not only positively impacted on 
Turkey’s trade, but has also led to changes in the behavior of both exports and imports with 
regards to their responsiveness to underlying variables. We observe that the income elasticity 
of both exports and imports are generally lower for the CU period, the effect of the real 
exchange rate (RER) on Turkey’s exports is stronger for the EU countries after CU.  
However, real exchange rate changes cease to have a significant impact on imports after the 
CUA.   
 
 
 
Keywords: Customs Union, Turkish Foreign Trade 
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           Bu tezde, Avrupa Birlii ile oluturulmu olan Gümrük Birlii’nin Türkiye ekonomisi 
üzerine etkileri 150’den fazla ülkeye ait verilerle 1980-2001 periyodunda panel data 
kullanılarak incelenmitir. Türkiye’nin ticari liberalizasyonu Avrupa Birlii ile imzalanan 
Ortak Gümrük Tarifesi ile deitirilemez bir ivme kazanmıtır. Gümrük Birlii Anlaması 6 
Mart 1995 tarihinde taraflar arasında imzalanmıtır. Böylelikle, Türkiye Avrupa Birlii 
ülkelerinden yaptıı imal edilmi ürünler ithalatında gümrük vergilerini kaldırmı 
bulunmaktadır. Bu çalımada Gümrük Birlii Anlaması’nın Türkiye ihracatına ve ithalatına 
olan etkileri fiyat, gelir, ekonomik kriz ve kurumsal deikenler irdelenerek analiz edilmitir. 
Sonuçlara göre Gümrük Birlii Anlaması sadece Türkiye’nin ticaretini etkilemekle 
kalmamı; Türkiye ihracat ve ithalatının incelenen deikenlere göre davranısal deiimlerini 
de ortaya koymutur. Hem ihracatın hem de ithalatın gelir elastikiyetlerinde Gümrük Birlii 
periyodu sonrasında bir azalma gözlenirken; Gümrük Birlii sonrasında Türkiye’nin Avrupa 
Birlii’ne ihracatında reel döviz kurunun etkisinin arttıı bulunmutur. Bununla birlikte, reel 
döviz kurunun ithalat üzerinde, Gümrük Birlii sonrasında, anlamlı bir etki yaratmadıı 
gösterilmitir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Gümrük Birlii, Türkiye Dı Ticareti 
 
  v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
  
 
 
I would like to thank Asst. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı and Assoc. Prof. Fatma Takın for their 
supervision and guidance through the development of this thesis. Their patience and 
encouraging supervision brought my research up to this point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT..............................................................................................................................iii 
 
ÖZET.........................................................................................................................................iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES....................................................................................................................vii 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................1 
 
CHAPTER 2: CUSTOMS UNION WITH EU...........................................................................5 
   
  2.1. International Organizations and Turkey.......................................................5 
  2.2. Turkey – EU Relations and the Implementation of the Customs Union…..7 
  2.3. Review of Customs Union Theory…………………….............................10 
   
CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY………………………………15 
 
  3.1. The Pre-Customs Union Period…………………………………………..15 
  3.2. The Post-Customs Union Period…………………………………………18 
            3.3. Studies on the Effects of the Customs Union on the Turkish Economy….24 
CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY……………………………………………..27 
            4.1. A Review of Trade Models……………………………………………….27 
            4.2. Data and the Variables Used in the Estimations………………………….36 
         4.3. Methodology and Models…………………………………………………38 
CHAPTER 5: REGRESSION ANALYSIS…………………………………………………..42 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………..54 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………….56 
APPENDIX…………………………………………………………………………………...60  
 
 
  
 
 
  vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
1. Table 3.1 Foreign Trade Indicators for Selected Years…………………………………....16 
2. Table 3.2 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators…………………………………………….16 
3. Table 3.3 Export Incentives, Weighted Average Subsidy Rates on Manufactured Exports.17 
4. Table 3.4 Exports by Countries, 1996-2000……………………………………….............19 
5. Table 3.5 Imports by Countries, 1996-2000……………………………………………….21 
6. Table 3.6 Foreign trade price indices, US Dollar, ISIC Revised 3 (1994=100)…………...21 
7. Table 3.7 Turkey-EU Selected Trade Indicators (current US$)…………………………...22 
8. Table 5.1 Fixed-Effect Results……………………………………………………………..45 
9. Table 5.2 Wald test results for the significance of the sum of the coefficients in  
              Table 5.1, Equations (1.3) and (2.3)…………………………………………….47 
10. Table 5.3 Fixed-Effect Results with Crises Periods……………………………………...48 
11. Table 5.4 Wald test results for the significance of the sum of the coefficients for  
               Table 5.3, Equations (1.3) and (2.3)…………………………………………...49 
 
12. Table 5.5 Regression results using only EU and non-EU samples……………………….53 
 
 
 
 
  1 
  CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, the concepts of globalization of the world economy and international economic 
integration have taken the place of the nationalism movement of the prewar era. As Haberler 
(1964) stated, we “live in the age of integration”. Especially, economic interaction and 
integration among Western European countries have grown rapidly since the Second World 
War. 
Balassa (1961, p. 1) defines economic integration “as a process and as a state of 
affairs”.  This definition should be understood as the combination of separate economies into 
larger groupings. Generally, the first step of economic integration is free movements of goods 
and services. Then, free movement of production factors, capital and labor, comes as the next 
objective. Harmonization of the government policies of the member countries and policy co-
ordination is seen as the last but the most difficult stage.  
One of the highly successful examples of integration is the European Union. The idea 
of a united Europe has been a dominant thinking after the Second World War. The process of 
European integration was launched on 9 May 1950 with Schuman Declaration. The European 
Economic Community (EEC) was founded through the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by six 
European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany) 
and can be seen as the successor of the European Community of Steel and Coal (ECSC), 
which was founded in 1951. 
 This initial economic integration was later on extended to both political and economic 
arenas due to the new situation of the world. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
joined in 1973, and the ECC became a ten-member community with Greece at the start of 
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1981. Spain and Portugal joined the community in 1986. Lastly, Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
became the members in 1995. Today, EU has 15 member states and is preparing for the 
accession of 13 eastern and southern European countries, including Turkey. Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey are candidate-to-be countries. Ten countries (Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech and Slovak republics, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta) are due 
to join the European Union in May 2004 following a landmark enlargement summit in 
Copenhagen, ending decades of division in the continent and taking total membership to 25. 
 The degree of combination leads to different types of preferential trading 
arrangements from the weakest form of economic integration to the most complex stages. The 
lowest degree of economic integration is the preferential trading club. Member countries of 
the club reduce their respective duties on imports of goods from each other and each member 
country of the preferential trading club retains the external tariffs against the rest of the world. 
Commonwealth Preference System is the most known example of preferential trading clubs. 
A free trade area is a preferential arrangement in which tariff rates are reduced to zero among 
members and each country has its own external tariffs against the outside world. European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA), founded in 1960, is an example of a free trade agreement. Another 
example is NAFTA, which is a trade agreement between Canada, Mexico and the United 
States, entered into force January 1, 1994.  
 A customs union is generally defined as an arrangement in which there is zero duty 
among members on imports of goods and services, and a common external tariff. Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg created a customs union in 1948 and formed the Benelux 
Economic Union in 1960. The Benelux Union was an experience of a customs union for the 
European Community and became an incentive for other European countries. 
 The step beyond the customs union is the formation of a common market. A common 
market can be formulated as the integration of a customs union and the free movement of all 
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factors of production among member countries of the common market. An economic union is 
the most complete degree of economic integration. In addition to a common market 
formation, member countries unify their monetary, fiscal, and socioeconomic policies. In 
other words, an economic union requires policy integration among members. 
 Lipsey (1960) defines the theory of customs union as a “branch of tariff theory which 
deals with the effects of geographically discriminatory changes in trade barriers”. 
Chacholiades (1978, p. 543) has a similar definition of the theory of customs union: “new 
branch of the tariffs and deals primarily with the effects of geographical discrimination”. He 
also adds that the effects of preferential trading are the principal concern of theory of customs 
union. In the related literature, there are many studies about the customs union theory. The 
pioneer in the theory of CU is Jacob Viner (1950). In his book The Customs Union Issue, 
Viner demonstrated that the formation of a CU generates two static effects: trade creation and 
trade diversion. The contribution of Viner on the CU issue has had dominant impacts on 
economists thinking on economic integration. Viner stated that CU may reduce the world’s 
economic efficiency. The further discussions are presented in Chapter 2 of the study.  
This study has two major purposes. The first is to explain the nature of the Customs 
Union Agreement (CUA) between Turkey and the EU and to take a closer look at the Turkish 
trade in this context. The second is to analyze the international trade of Turkey by using 
econometric methods and estimating the changes of Turkish foreign trade before and after the 
Customs Union with the EU. 
 Our unbalanced panel data set consists of more than 150 countries covering the years 
between 1980 and 2001, yielding more than 2000 observations. We analyze Turkey’s trade 
with all countries in the CU period and take into account the bilateral real exchange rates and 
income levels of all of the trade partners  in our data set. 
  4 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the customs union with the EU, 
and gives the historical perspective of Turkey relations with the Community. Chapter 3 
provides the general outlook on the Turkish economy before and after the customs union from 
the perspective of foreign trade and selected macroeconomic variables. Chapter 4 presents the 
procedure to evaluate the customs union effects on Turkey’s trade empirically, and discusses 
the export-import modeling of the literature. Chapter 5 presents the results of regression 
analysis on Turkish exports and Turkish imports where the impact of the CU is examined 
empirically. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 CUSTOMS UNION WITH EU  
This chapter begins with analysis of Turkey’s multidimensional international 
economic policy that reconciles West with East and North with South. Then, the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU is described and the Custom Union Agreement is examined. The 
chapter ends with the theory of customs union and its historical background. 
2.1 International Organizations and Turkey  
Turkish governments followed a policy of westernization since 1923, foundation of 
the Republic of Turkey. Both domestic and foreign policy was directed through reaching this 
ultimate goal. Turkey applied to join to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the 
Council of Europe and the OEEC (the Organization for European Economic Co-operation) to 
show her desire to be a part of the Western Alliance. 
One of the organizations that Turkey has been in contact with is the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). The EFTA was founded on the premise of free trade among its 
member countries by a convention signed in Stockholm on 4 January 1960. The liberalization 
of trade in goods among the member countries was the main objective of the Association. 
Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom were the 
seven founding members of the EFTA. Today, the EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Switzerland, and Norway.  
To strengthen the already preferential relationship between the EFTA States and the 
European Union, the European Economic Area (EEA) was resulted in the early 1990s. The 
EEA established a single market for all forms of trade, including trade in services and the free
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movement of labor between and among the EFTA States, excluding Switzerland, and the 
European Union (http://www.efta.int/). 
The EFTA States have been expanding trade relations with the countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region since 1990. Parallel to the EEA with the 
EU, the EFTA signed free trade agreement with Turkey in 1991. Customs barriers of the 
seven EFTA members vis-à-vis Turkey were dismantled, transition period for Turkey was 
granted. This agreement contains clauses on state-aid, competition policy, anti-dumping, 
intellectual property. On 25 June 1992, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine constituted The Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which aims to ensure free market, economic prosperity, and 
regional stability in the Black Sea. 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an intergovernmental regional 
organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of providing 
economic, technical and cultural cooperation among members. The expansion of mutual trade 
and promotion of conditions for sustained economic growth in the region are the objectives of 
the organization. The Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republics 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan 
joined to the organization in 1992. 
On June 15, 1997, Developing–8 (D–8) was formed by Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey with the Istanbul Declaration. This formation 
declared that creating new opportunities in trade relations, and enriching the social and 
economic relations of the member countries would be the goals of the cooperation. 
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The full membership to the European Union has been primary objective of the Turkish 
foreign policy. Turkey has shown a close interest in Europe’s integration process from the 
very beginning. Turkey and the EU work towards opening of accession talks in early 2005 in 
line with the conclusions of the 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit. 
2.2 Turkey – EU Relations and the Implementation of the Customs Union 
  The starting point of the formal relationship between the EEC and Turkey was the 
Association Agreement (Ankara-Agreement) in 1963. This agreement, which was put into 
force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through 
the establishment in three phases of a customs union which would serve as an instrument to 
bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey. 
 The first phase, which was started in 1964, was the preparatory stage and it involved 
the provision of ECU 175 million for assisting Turkey’s development.  The second stage was 
to be a transitional period with the aim of gradually introducing a customs union proper. This 
period would involve the adoption of common external tariffs and arrangements that would 
bring about general economic policy alignment. The second financial protocol was to assign 
loans of up to ECU 300 million to ease the hardships of increased economic competition. The 
third and the final stage would entail intensification of the coordination of economic policies. 
Turkey would reach the final stage within a period of twenty-two years at maximum 
(Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, 1996, Avrupa Birlii ve Türkiye). However, the 
agreement did not fix a time limit for the final phase which would precede further integration.  
 In 1973, additional protocol came into effect. The protocol defined a period of 22 
years for the bringing about of a customs union. It provided that the EEC would abolish tariff 
and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey (with some exceptions including fabrics) 
upon the entry into force of the protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance 
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with a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years, and called for the 
harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the EU in economic matters. Furthermore, 
the additional protocol envisaged the free circulation of labor force between the parties in the 
next 12 to 22 years. 
 Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, on the basis of the EEC Treaty's article 
237, which gave any European country the right to do so. Turkey's request for accession, filed 
not under the relevant provisions of the Ankara Agreement but those of the Treaty of Rome, 
underwent the normal procedures. The Council forwarded Turkey's application to the 
Commission for the preparation of an “Opinion”. This has reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility, 
given that the Council turned down a similar application by Morocco on the grounds that 
Morocco is not a European country.  
The Commission's Opinion was completed on 18 December 1989 and was endorsed 
by the Council on 5 February 1990. It basically underlined Turkey's eligibility for 
membership, yet deferred the in-depth analysis of Turkey's application until the emergence of 
a more favorable environment. It also mentioned that Turkey's accession was prevented 
equally by the EC's own situation on the eve of the Single Market's completion that prevented 
the consideration of further enlargement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998, Relations 
Between Turkey and the European Union). It went on to underpin the need for a 
comprehensive cooperation program aiming at facilitating the integration of the two sides and 
added that the Customs Union should be completed in 1995, as envisaged.  
 On 6 March 1995, the European Union and Turkey signed agreement on Customs 
Union. Turkey’s tariffs and levies on imports of manufactured products from the European 
Union were eliminated by this agreement. Trade in agricultural products, with the exception 
of agro-industrial products, which is processed food, was, however, excluded. Turkey would 
also apply EU’s common external tariff on imports from the third countries. The main 
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chapters of the “Decision of the EU-Turkey Association Council” are free movement of 
goods, commercial policy, agricultural products, customs provisions, approximation of laws, 
institutional provisions, and general and final provisions. 
Free movement of goods and commercial policy are applied to products except 
agricultural products as defined in the Article 11 of the Association Agreement. Elimination 
of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect, elimination of quantitative restrictions 
and measures having equivalent effect, commercial policy, Common Customs Tariff and 
preferential tariff policies and processed agricultural products are the sections in the first 
chapter of the Decision. 
The CU does not cover agricultural goods and the free circulation of agricultural 
products will only be implemented upon Turkey’s alignment of it’s polices to the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy. The Association Council states in the chapter of agricultural 
products that an additional period is required to put in place the conditions necessary to 
achieve free movement of these products.  
 The third chapter, customs provisions, lists the fields in which Turkey shall adopt 
provisions such as origin of goods, customs value of goods, introduction of goods into the 
territory of the customs union, customs declaration, and release for free circulation, 
suspenseful arrangements and customs procedures with economic impact, movement of 
goods, customs debt, and right of appeal. 
 Protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property, competition rules of the 
CU, trade defense instruments, government procurement, direct and indirect taxation, are 
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scrutinized under the title of approximation of laws. In textile and clothing sector, Turkey has 
aligned its state aid system with that of the EU by 1996.1  
The fifth chapter of the Decision is the institutional provisions. This chapter explains 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union Joint Committee, consultation and decision procedures, 
settlement of disputes, safeguard measures. The general and final provisions conclude the 
Decision with the date of entry into force. 
Applying measures that are compatible with the import, export, and textiles legislation 
of the EU, the Common Customs Tariff (CCT), and the preferential trade regime applicable to 
third countries within a period of five years from the entry into force of the Decision are the 
basic obligations for the harmonization with the EU’s external trade policy. 
2.3 Review of Customs Union Theory 
In this section, a brief review of the literature on the theory of customs union is 
presented in chronological order. The pioneer in the theory of CU is Jacob Viner (1950). In 
his book The Customs Union Issue, Viner demonstrates that the formation of a CU generates 
two static effects: trade creation and trade diversion. In the former case imports from the 
customs-union partner are substituted for domestic production; while in the latter they are 
substituted for imports from third countries, which remain subject to a tariff duty 
(Chacholiades, p.543). 
Viner points out that trade creation raises the home country’s welfare, and trade 
diversion lowers it.  He deals only with the production effects, which arise from the shift in 
the national locus of production. Consumption effects arise from the cheapening of goods in 
member countries. 
                                                
1
 Bayar et al. (2000) report the EU has accepted the Turkey’s declaration of September 1995 asserting that “there 
are no specific state aids in Turkey and due to their general or regional character.”  
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Makower and Morton (1953) address the question of whether a CU among the 
countries in a protectionist world improves or worsens the allocation of resources in the world 
as a whole. They argue that a CU brings greater gain if the union is formed among 
complementary economies. In other words, trade is the more advantageous, the greater the 
comparative cost differences between trading countries.  Any given union may bring both 
gains and losses with respect to different commodities. The net gain or loss of any given 
union can be determined only when the consumers’ marginal substitution rates for the 
different consumer goods are given.  
According to Gehrels and Johnston (1955), in judging any given customs union, it is 
necessary to examine whether the trade-creating or the trade-diverting effect is stronger. 
There is no a priori presumption that the one or the other will predominate. In case the trade-
creation effect predominates, the members of the customs union would be better off via the 
improved terms of trade. On the other hand, the predomination of the trade-diverting effect 
would cause damage for the union. The trade diversion, in the sense of a shift of imports to a 
higher-cost source of supply, implies a terms of trade loss. 
The formation of a CU necessarily violates the Pareto-optimum conditions because of 
the existence of tariffs. Then, the theory of the second best is directly applicable to the theory 
of CU. The theory of the second best deals with suboptimal situations.  Following Lipsey and 
Lancaster (1956), the general theorem of the second best states that if one of the Paretian 
optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, a second best optimum situation is achieved only by 
departing from all other optimum conditions. Generally, the study of CU is a study in the 
theory of second best [see also Viner (1950) and Meade (1955b)]. 
A customs union changes relative prices and this leads to substitution between 
commodities. Meade (1955), Gehrels (1956), and Lipsey (1957) all analyze this effect 
independently and conclude that the substitution effect would tend to increase the imports 
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from a country’s union partner and to diminish both the imports from the rest of the world and 
the consumption of domestic commodities. 
Lipsey (1957), moreover, shows that when consumption effects are allowed for the 
simple conclusions that trade creation is good and trade diversion is bad are no longer valid. 
A country may form a trade-diverting customs union and yet gain an increase in welfare in the 
sense that every consumer moves to a higher indifference curve. Lipsey (1960) summarizes 
the sources of welfare effects of CU as the specialization of production according to 
comparative advantage, economies of scale, changes in the terms of trade, forced changes in 
efficiency due to increased foreign competition, and a change in the rate of economic growth. 
Sproas (1964) proposes a criterion which more decisively indicates whether a CU 
leads to net trade creation or net trade diversion. The condition for trade creation depends on 
the relation between two ratios. The first ratio is the difference between the two members’ 
pre-union tariff rates and the post-union common tariff against non-members, and the second 
ratio deals with the price derivatives (slopes) of the two members’ supply functions.  
Ruling out gains from changes in the terms of trade, economies of scale, and other 
considerations, Cooper and Massell (1965) analyze the pure theory of CU. The rationale or 
motivation for customs union is argued in the Cooper-Massell analysis. Arndt (1969) 
demonstrates the superiority of CU as a particular type of tariff policy. However, a country 
may elect nonmembership if increased market share and growth potential outside the union is 
possible. Bhagwati (1971) shows that the fixed level of imports is a sufficient condition for a 
trade-diverting CU to be welfare reducing by applying a general-equilibrium model of 
Lipsey’s analysis (with the assumption of fixed consumption pattern) allowing production 
variability.  
Corden (1972) incorporates economies of scale in the theory of CU and presents two 
new concepts that are: the cost-reduction effect and the trade-suppression effect, as 
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supplementary of the trade-creation and trade-diversion effects. The cost-reduction effect, in 
Corden’s terms, is more important than the trade-suppression effect. Krauss (1972) interprets 
the developments in the theory of CU from the perspectives of theoretical and institutional 
extensions. The approaches to the theory of CU depending on various assumptions as to the 
nature of the political process are examined and discussed in Krauss’s study.   
Petith (1977) presents the relationship between the terms of trade and European 
integration and calculated terms of trade gains from the formation of CU in Europe2. 
Following the model of Mundell (1964), a number of propositions about the effects of 
integration on the terms of trade are derived in the study of Petith. Improvements in the terms 
of trade are submitted as one of the major effects of European integration. 
Collier (1979) considers the welfare effects of the Vinerian model and shows that both 
the Vinerian effects are subsets of a wider class of effects. Berglas (1979) uses the second best 
approach to show that the reduction of tariffs on commodities that are imported by all the 
member countries is not necessarily welfare improving. Using a general equilibrium analysis 
of preferential trading the effect of a custom union on income distribution among member 
countries is analyzed. 
McMillan and McCann (1981) examine the three-commodity, three-country model of 
customs union due to Meade (1955), Lipsey (1970), and Vanek (1965). A country would gain 
from the lowering of tariffs following the formation of a customs union if and only if the 
domestically produced commodity and the commodity imported from the partner country are 
net substitutes. The authors conclude that in a many-country world there will be incentives for 
countries to make a sequence of bilateral agreements mutually to reduce tariffs, until each 
country has reduced its tariffs on trade with at least one other country. 
                                                
2
 The potential terms-of-trade effects of Customs union have been analyzed by Viner (1950), Meade (1955), 
Arndt (1962, 1969), Johnson (1962), Vanek (1965),  Melvin (1969), Kemp (1969), and Lipsey (1970).  
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Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) demonstrate that unilateral tariff reduction need not 
dominate a CU from an economic viewpoint. Their main argument is that “in a world in 
which tariffs and other obstacles to trade exist, it is meaningless to analyze the effects of 
freeing trade between customs union members if we assume that there are no impediments to 
trade with outsider country.” 
 Tironi (1982) adds the foreign profit creation and diversion effects to the classical 
trade creation and diversion effects of CU and emphasize the importance of these new 
concepts to estimate a country’s overall gain or loss from the participation of all foreign firms 
in the common market. Tironi means the measurement of the international income 
redistribution that resulted from changes in foreign firms’ rents and monopolistic profits by 
using the terms the foreign profit creation and diversion effects. 
Krueger (1995) states the differences between CU and free trade agreements, 
examines the complications from multiple free trade agreements and political economy of 
them. The author, also, concludes that a CU is always Pareto-superior to a free trade 
agreement on welfare grounds.3 
 Fifty years ago, Viner conjectured that the CU may reduce the potential world welfare, 
and the debate has begun. The historical development of the customs union theory is 
scrutinized in this section. Before the examination of the effects of the CU on the Turkish 
economy we identify some stylized facts of the Turkish economy starting from the trade 
liberalization in Chapter 3. 
 
 
                                                
3
 Kemp and Wan (1976) state that a CU can be always Pareto-improving when an appropriate Common External 
Tariffs and redistribution inside the union are implemented. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY 
 The Turkish economy has experienced a considerable structural transformation within 
the past two decades. Liberalization of the economy began with the introduction of a far-
reaching structural adjustment program in 1980. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the 
general overview of the Turkish economy before and after the customs union, especially with 
regards to foreign trade and selected macroeconomic variables.  A survey of the economic 
literature on the effects of the CU concludes the chapter. 
3.1 The Pre-Customs Union Period 
 Until 1980, Turkey had an inward-oriented development strategy and followed an 
import-substituting industrialization growth path. Besides high import barriers, the 
remittances of almost a half-million Turkish workers were the main characteristics of that 
period. The institutionalization of formal planning mechanism constituted the development 
efforts of Turkey after 1960s. Rapid economic growth occurred as a consequence of 
expansion in public demand and state enterprise investments. Restrictive trade regime 
dominated the foreign trade policies to achieve the import-substitution industrialization goals.  
  Turkey achieved 6.8 percent average GNP growth rate during the First Five Year Plan, 
1963-1967, and the Second Five Year Plan, 1968-1972, (Celàsun and Rodrik, 1989). 
However, the balance of foreign trade did not show positive signs parallel with the stability of 
domestic indicators. High and growing trade deficits caused the country to borrow from 
foreign sources. Trade deficit has always been one of the most important economic problems 
in foreign trade of Turkey. The country had faced trade deficits since 1923 with the 
exceptions of 1930-1937 and 1939-1946 (see, SIS, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, various 
years). 
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Table 3.1 Foreign trade indicators for selected years (million current US dollars) 
  1963 1968 1972 1978 1980 
Imports  687,6 763,6 1.562,5 4.599,1 7.909,4 
Exports  368,1 496,1 884,9 2.288,1 2.910,1 
Trade deficit 319,5 267,2 677,5 2.310,8 4.999,3 
Export-to-import ratio (%) 53,5 65,0 56,6 49,8 36,8 
Source: SIS, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, various years.      
 
 
 
 The long period of economic growth that had begun in the early 1960s reached its 
climax in 1976; this period of growth ended with a debt rescheduling in 1977 (Rodrik, 1990). 
Table 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the key foreign trade indicators before the beginning of the 
export-oriented time period.  
 
Table 3.2 Selected macroeconomic indicators (Period Average) 
  1971-1976 1977-1980 
GNP growth rate (%) 7,7 1,3 
Exports / GNP (%) 3,8 3,3 
Imports / GNP (%) 8,4 8,5 
Source: Guncavdi et al. (1998), Table 1.  
 
 Likewise, after two unsuccessful stand-by agreements with IMF in 1978 and 1979, the 
Turkish government announced a comprehensive stabilization and structural adjustment 
program in January 1980. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund approved 
this program. This was the end of the import-substitution industrialization period. In other 
words, Turkey faced a transition from inward-to outward-oriented strategies by the year 1980. 
 The liberalization program, which was announced in 1980, aimed to be integrated with 
the world economy. From the foreign trade perspective, three main policy changes were 
important: exchange rate policy changes, export-driven growth strategies, and liberalization of 
the imports. The foreign trade sector increased in importance for Turkey after 1980s with 
these developments. 
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 The export of the goods has been seen as the engine of growth after 1980 by the 
governments. Export-promotion policies replaced inward-oriented strategies. The government 
used credit subsidies, export tax rebates, and foreign exchange allocations to encourage and 
promote faster growth of exports. The value of these direct subsidies averaged about 20 per 
cent of total exports and varied considerably across goods. Table 3.3 gives a brief description 
of the export incentives during 1980-1986. Rebate rates were lowered gradually after 1983, 
and they were abolished in 1989. 
 
Table 3.3 Export Incentives, Weighted Average Subsidy Rates on Manufactured Exports (%) 
  1980 1982 1984 1986 
Elements of Subsidya     
Export tax rebates 0,64 10,07 11,07 7,55 
Preferential export credits 15,93 7,23 1,07  
Foreign exchange allocation and duty-free imports 5,48 4,21 2,98 6,22 
RUSF cash grantsb (Uniform, flat rate)    2,18 
Total subsidya 22,05 21,51 15,12 15,95 
a Subsidy rates are weighted averages, and weights are the export shares of manufactured goods in total manufactured 
 Exports. 
b RUSF: Resource Utilization and Support Fund. 
Source: Baysan and Blitzer  (1990), Table 1.2 
     
 Barlow and Senses (1995) has pointed out that the most powerful factor for the 
Turkish export boom was real exchange rate depreciation. Export subsidies were the second 
policy after exchange rate changes. Reform of the exchange rate regime has been 
accompanied by trade liberalization. Devaluation of the currency helped to boost exports. 
However, this increase has not been sufficient to cover the surge in imports since 
liberalization. The trade deficits were due to import values that grew faster than in export 
values. 
 The quota list was removed in 1981. The government announced the 1984 Import 
Program as part of a program to replace the quantitative restrictions with tariffs. Tariffs 
increased for consumer goods. Average tariffs before December 1983 was 18 per cent for 
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total consumer goods, and increased to 26.2 per cent by January 1984. However, tariffs for 
intermediate goods and capital goods were reduced (Baysan and Blitzer, 1991, Table 4.4). 
3.2 The Post-Customs Union Period 
 In this section, foreign trade performance of the Turkish economy after the customs 
union arrangement (CUA) is investigated. Changes in exports, imports, the real exchange rate 
and the terms of trade during the post-integration period are studied in detail. Relations 
between Turkey and the EU have developed a new dynamic after the sides have signed the 
Customs Union Agreement, which came into effect in the beginning of 1996. Initiating the 
final phase of Turkey’s economic integration with the EU the Agreement marks the peak of 
relations that started with the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. 
 In 1996, the share of exports to the EU was 49.7 per cent of all exports of Turkey. The 
share of the EU in the Turkish exports decreased at the rate of 6.62 per cent in 1997.  A 
recovery was seen in 1998 and in 1999, with annual increases at the rates of 6.80 and 7.28 per 
cent, respectively. However, it was not a continuous increase. In 2000, the share of exports to 
the EU decreased as an annual percentage point of 2.75 (see Table 3.4). 
 
 
Table 3.4 Exports By Countries (Percent Share), 1996-2000 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 OECD Countries 62,1 59,3 62,9 67,9 68,6 
    EU Countries 49,7 46,6 50,0 54,0 52,5 
    EFTA Countries 1,4 1,6 1,3 1,4 1,2 
    Other OECD Countries 10,9 11,1 11,6 12,6 14,9 
 Non OECD Countries 37,9 40,7 34,0 29,2 28,2 
   Europe + CIS Countries 15,7 17,8 14,8 10,3 10,8 
   African Countries 5,0 4,7 6,7 6,2 4,9 
   American Countries 0,6 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,9 
   Middle East Countries 9,7 9,1 8,1 8,3 7,8 
   Other Asian Countries 4,9 4,5 2,4 2,6 2,4 
   Other Countries 2,0 3,8 1,1 0,8 1,4 
Source: SPO, www.dpt.gov.tr  
Note: Foreign trade statistics exclude export and import data obtained from duty-free zones and duty-free shops. 
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 Clothing, food, and textiles were the main export sectors of Turkey to the EU, with 
64.6 per cent during 1998. These three sectors were also the top three commodities with the 
highest export shares (52 per cent) in trade with non-EU countries. Togan (2000) states that 
clothing, textiles, and automotive products were also the main sectors that had the highest 
growth rate of imports from the EU during 1990-1998. Clothing, other products, and textiles 
were the top three commodities with the highest growth rate of imports from the non-EU 
countries. Lohrmann (2000), however, asserts that the clothing sector had started to loose its 
importance and transport equipment; road vehicles, motorcycles, TVs and some electrical 
household appliances have started to gain importance in the Turkish foreign trade.  
 It should be regarded that other transport equipment, power generating machinery, 
iron and steel, other products, and electrical machinery and apparatus are commodities whose 
export growth rates to the EU exceeded the growth rate of exports to non-EU countries over 
the period 1990-1998 (Togan, 2000), though these industries were not the traditional export 
sectors of Turkey. Especially, the trade balance in refrigerators, cookers, and color TVs were 
positive (Lohrmann, 2000). These developments have indicated a change of export 
composition. Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix present the annual growth rates of exports 
(imports) of commodities to (from) the EU and to (from) the world. The commodities are 
classified as eleven groups based on the Harmonized Commodity description.4 
 In the sections of Works of Art (works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques), we 
observe annual growth rate of 72.30 per cent in exports (51.26 per cent in imports) to the EU 
during 1995-2001.  Miscellaneous (furniture; bedding, mattresses, cushions etc; other lamps 
& light fitting, illuminated signs and nameplates, prefabricated buildings, Toys, games & 
sports equipment; parts & accessories, miscellaneous manufactured articles) section has an 
                                                
4
 The harmonized system is a commodity classification prepared by the Customs Cooperation Council. This 
classification has been used in Turkey since 1989 was improved as 8-digit position numbers. Because Turkey 
entered the Customs Union in 1996, it has been used 12-digit position numbers by Harmonized System related 
Combined Nomenclature (see SIS, Foreign Trade Statistics, various years). 
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annual growth rate of 20.30 per cent in exports to the EU. However, we have not observed 
similar increase in imports from the EU (annual growth rate of 4.30 per cent). Transportation 
Equipment section which covers railway or tramway. locomotives, rolling stock, track fixtures 
and parts thereof; mechanical & electro-mechanical traffic signal equipment, vehicles, (not 
railway, tramway, rolling stock); parts and accessories, aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof, 
ships, boats and floating structures has an high annual growth rate during the period we have 
examined (annual growth rate of 4.30 per cent in exports to the EU).  
 In 1996, the share of imports from the EU was 53.0 per cent of all imports of Turkey. 
The share of the EU in Turkish imports decreased by 1.80 per cent in 1997. Small increases 
were observed in 1998 and 1999. In 2000, the share of imports to the EU decreased by 3.70 
percent, which was the sharpest change within this period (see Table 3.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Imports By Countries  (Percent Share), 1996-2000 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
OECD Countries 71,3 71,7 72,9 69,6 65,4 
    EU Countries 53,0 51,2 52,4 52,6 48,9 
    EFTA Countries 2,5 2,7 2,5 2,3 2,1 
    Other OECD Countries 15,7 17,8 17,9 14,7 14,4 
 Non OECD Countries 28,7 28,3 26,2 29,1 33,7 
   Europe + CIS Countries 9,4 9,6 10,2 11,5 13,2 
   African Countries 4,6 4,5 3,8 4,1 5,0 
   American Countries 1,5 1,6 1,6 1,2 1,1 
   Middle East Countries 7,4 5,6 4,2 4,9 5,7 
   Other Asian Countries 5,1 5,2 5,7 5,9 6,5 
   Other Countries 0,7 1,8 0,7 1,5 2,2 
Source: SPO, www.dpt.gov.tr 
Note: Foreign trade statistics exclude export and import data obtained from duty-free zones and duty-free shops. 
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 The terms of trade, which is usually defined as the ratio of the countries export prices 
to import prices, is a key concept in evaluating the effects of price changes on welfare. The 
fall in the terms of trade since the first quarter of 1999 meant that the benefits of an increase 
in export volumes were lost to the Turkish economy since it was not translated into a 
commensurate increase in export values (see Table 3.6). Another factor was the outbreak of 
the East Asian crisis and the contagion effect to Brazilian and Russian economies. When the 
terms of trade declines, a larger volume of exports is necessary to finance a given volume of 
imports. 
Table 3.6  Foreign trade price indices, US Dollar, ISIC Revised 3   
                 (1994=100) 
Year Export price index Import price index Terms-of-trade index 
1996 108 110 98 
1997 103 100 102 
1998 98 96 102 
1999 92 91 101 
2000 88 95 92 
2001 86 95 90 
2002 83 93 90 
Source: The Central Bank of Turkey, Electronic Data Delivery System 
 
 
 To give a brief review of Turkey-EU trade relations, selected trade indicators are 
presented in Table 3.7. Trade volume of Turkey-EU trade, trade balance and the ratio of 
exports to imports are shown from 1980 to 2001, over which period Turkey has always faced 
with trade deficit with the EU. 
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Table 3.7 Turkey-EU  Selected Trade Indicators (current US$) 
Year X M X+M X-M X/M*100 
1980 1.377.269.984 2.586.449.984 3.963.719.968 -1.209.180.000 53 
1981 1.685.720.016 2.813.090.032 4.498.810.048 -1.127.370.016 60 
1982 1.923.729.968 2.777.700.016 4.701.429.984 -853.970.048 69 
1983 2.185.289.968 2.984.499.936 5.169.789.904 -799.209.968 73 
1984 2.948.489.968 3.535.109.920 6.483.599.888 -586.619.952 83 
1985 3.398.419.952 4.181.659.968 7.580.079.920 -783.240.016 81 
1986 3.424.600.016 4.859.049.984 8.283.650.000 -1.434.449.968 70 
1987 5.132.460.080 6.074.232.888 11.206.692.968 -941.772.808 84 
1988 5.364.549.952 6.301.360.032 11.665.909.984 -936.810.080 85 
1989 5.680.538.080 6.485.238.040 12.165.776.120 -804.699.960 88 
1990 7.197.826.032 9.926.847.000 17.124.673.032 -2.729.020.968 73 
1991 7.377.131.056 9.896.992.864 17.274.123.920 -2.519.861.808 75 
1992 7.914.530.928 10.656.268.920 18.570.799.848 -2.741.737.992 74 
1993 7.602.754.992 13.868.999.808 21.471.754.800 -6.266.244.816 55 
1994 8.694.020.912 10.917.553.088 19.611.574.000 -2.223.532.176 80 
1995 11.083.935.728 16.862.474.992 27.946.410.720 -5.778.539.264 66 
1996 11.500.623.848 22.335.502.168 33.836.126.016 -10.834.878.320 51 
1997 12.250.086.280 24.835.349.912 37.085.436.192 -12.585.263.632 49 
1998 13.717.214.048 24.455.306.112 38.172.520.160 -10.738.092.064 56 
1999 14.351.728.752 21.416.256.200 35.767.984.952 -7.064.527.448 67 
2000 14.510.519.912 26.610.307.080 41.120.826.992 -12.099.787.168 55 
2001 16.118.322.680 18.280.409.984 34.398.732.664 -2.162.087.304 88 
   Note: The figures are based on merchandise exports and imports.  Source: World Bank.  
 
The real exchange rate can be defined as the nominal exchange rate that takes the 
inflation differentials among the countries into account. Its importance stems from the fact 
that it can be used as an indicator of competitiveness in the foreign trade of a country. Since 
this study aims to explain the effects of the CU with the EU we focus on the real effective 
exchange rate between Turkey and EU.5  It is one indicator of competitiveness of the foreign 
trade of Turkey. Because of the important role it plays in the Turkish economy, the real 
exchange rate has been one of the most debated issues for Turkey. It is calculated as follows: 
 
( )i indeks iiREER RER w= ⋅
                                       (3.1)
 
                                                
5
 The data for Belgium and Luxembourg are combined for the reason that data on Turkey’s bilateral trade with 
the two countries exists in a joined form.   
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REER is the real effective exchange rate index, iw is the country’s share in the total 
trade of Turkey, RER is the real exchange rate between the country i and Turkey in a given  
year (an increase in RER indicates real depreciation of the TL), and i , denotes the 
weighted summation over the countries.
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    Figure 3.1: 1980-2001 Turkey-EU Real Effective Exchange Rates (1995=1) 
 
The unsustainable macro conditions of the Turkish economy, which led the country to 
the economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001 were the main reason of the sharp 
decreases of both exports to and imports from the EU as a percentage share in foreign trade. 
After the 1994 devaluation, the real exchange rate started to appreciate again. The real 
exchange rate has been an important determinant of output, exports and imports, with 
depreciations having a positive effect on exports and output and a negative effect on imports.  
Some specific years are indicated in Figure 3.1. Appreciation of the Turkish Lira from 
1993 to 1994 and from 2000 to 2001 is clearly seen. A stabilization program was announced 
in 1994 with the aim of reducing the domestic demand and rate of inflation and to increase 
exports through the real depreciation of the Turkish lira. Also, the sudden devaluation of the 
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Turkish lira following the crisis of 2001 is captured in Figure 3.1. To sum up, the Turkish 
economy has exhibited considerable expansion in its international trade after 1980. The rest of 
the study focuses on the effects of the CU on the Turkish economy.6  
3.3 Studies on the Effects of the Customs Union on the Turkish Economy 
 There are a few studies on the macro and sectoral effects of the CU. In this section, the 
studies that examine the economic implications of the customs union between Turkey and the 
EU are presented. Most of the studies are based on computable general equilibrium 
techniques. Bayar et al. (2000) discuss the related literature and report the studies of Krueger, 
et al. (1995), Karluk (1996), Erzan and Filiztekin (1997)7, Togan (1997), Sayan and Demir 
(1998) that are not based on computable general equilibrium techniques.  
 According to Harrison et al. (1996), the CU was expected to influence the aggregate 
welfare through improved access to the EU and to the third markets by the reciprocity of the 
preferential access agreements. Improved access to third country markets would be the 
biggest gains from the customs union arrangement. They estimate that Turkey may stand to 
gain between 1 and 1.5 per cent of GDP annually from the customs union using a comparative 
static computable general equilibrium model for Turkey. It also may stand to lose about 1.4 
per cent of GDP from lost tariff revenues. The authors note that they do not estimate the long-
run dynamic impact on the growth rate of the Turkish economy. It can be predicted that the 
gains from the customs union would likely to be larger than the authors’ estimations.  
 Using applied intertemporal general equilibrium model, Mercenier and Yeldan (1997) 
discuss the dynamic impacts of trade liberalization scenarios for Turkey: effects of Turkish 
                                                
6
 There has been widespread and rapid trade liberalization in developing countries since 1980s, during which 
various multilateral trade negotiations, structural adjustments and stabilizations programmes have been launched. 
Meanwhile, most of the developing countries tended to relax controls over imports and moved from fixed to 
flexible exchange rate regimes. 
7
  Erzan and Filiztekin (1997) uses panel data to investigate whether the impact of the CU will be more severe on 
small and medium scale enterprises in comparison with large establishments as usually assumed by the 
authorities. 
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commitment to enter a CU with the EU and Turkey’s joining the European Single Market. 
Besides Turkey, six other regions (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the rest of the EU, 
and the rest of the world) are considered in their study. Each country has four perfectly 
competitive sectors (agriculture and primary products; food, beverage, and tobacco; other 
manufacturing industries and transport and services); and five noncompetitive industries 
which are pharmaceutical products; chemicals other than pharmaceutical products; motor 
vehicles; office machinery; and other machinery and transport materials. The authors deal 
with different scenarios as follows. 
 The first scenario of the Customs Union with the EU, limited to the tariff 
harmonization reform as currently under implementation, is undesirable with the welfare cost 
of implementing the CU amounts to a sacrifice of real consumption on the whole time horizon 
of almost 1 % (-0,832 %). The second scenario, full commodity market integration with the 
EU, shows the welfare gain would amount to almost 1 % (+ 0,897 %) over the whole time 
horizon. In summary, the CU should be complemented with full market integration with the 
European Union. Otherwise, a partial trade reform will be inadequate to improve domestic 
welfare alone. 
 Bekmez (2002) studies a computable general equilibrium model and compares the 
results of the various policy scenarios. Dividing the Turkish economy into twenty-two sectors 
(two agricultural, eighteen manufacturing, and two service sectors), the differentiation of 
exports and imports as the EU and the rest of the world is considered. The first scenario is the 
CU with the EU and the estimations of the author shows that there is a 2 per cent decrease in 
GDP and an 8 per cent decrease in government revenue. In the scenario of full membership 
with the EU, greater increases in the EU exports than the customs union scenario in all sectors 
except transportation equipment are observed. Also, in the beverage industry, paper and 
publishing, and glass products sectors domestic production would increase while domestic 
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demand for those goods would decrease. Under the full membership with replacement tax 
scenario, Turkish products might be more expensive in the world market, and almost all 
sectors would experience a decrease in exports.  
 All tariffs are removed under the free trade scenario, and  the author shows that the 
trade-creation and the trade-diversion effects of free trade might be relatively equal for the EU 
and the for the rest of the world. Bekmez notes that the success of the trade policy reforms 
depends crucially on reductions in both tariffs and export subsidies. Similar to Mercenier and 
Yeldan (1997), the author concludes that the Turkish economy would be better off with full 
EU membership. 
 In summary, the studies that are examined in this section have the common conclusion 
that the CU will have a small welfare effect on the Turkish economy. Increased opportunity of 
getting new technologies, improving quality and increasing occasions for exports to the EU 
can also be counted as the gains from the CU. However, the full membership to the EU is the 
most crucial point that should orient the macroeconomic policies.      
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter contains the discussion of the trade models that deals with income and 
price effects in foreign trade. Then, the variables and data of the study are also thoroughly 
described in this chapter, and this is accompanied by the econometric methodology used for 
estimations. 
4.1 A Review of Trade Models 
Most of the empirical researches on trade relations have dealt with the estimation of 
income and price elasticities and application of macro-economic policy issues. The imperfect 
substitutes model and the perfect substitutes model have been dominated the empirical 
literature. Goldstein and Khan (1984) summarize these two general models and discuss 
income and price effects in foreign trade. 
The first model, the imperfect substitutes model, assumes that imports and exports are 
not perfect substitutes for domestic goods. In equations (4.1) - (4.8) below, the authors present 
imperfect substitutes model of country i’s imports from and exports to the rest of the world 
(*) which determines the quantity of imports demanded in country i, ( diI ), the quantity of 
country i’s exports demanded by the rest of the world, ( diX ), the quantity of imports supplied 
to country i from the rest of the world, ( siI ), the quantity of exports supplied from country i to 
the rest of the world, ( siX ), the domestic currency prices paid by importers in the two regions, 
( iPI and *PI ), and the domestic currency prices received by exporters in two regions, ( iPX , 
*PX ). The consumer is assumed as to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint in the 
imperfect substitutes model. 
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( ), , ,di i i iI f Y PI P=            1 3, 0,f f >  2 0,f <                                                       (4.1) 
( )* *, , ,di iX g Y e PX P e=         1 3, 0,g g >  2 0,g <                                                      (4.2) 
( )* * *1 , ,siI h PI S P = +        1 0,h >        2 0,h <                                     (4.3) 
( )1 , ,si i i iX j PX S P= +         1 0,j >        2 0,j <                 (4.4) 
( )* 1 ,i iPI PX T e= +            (4.5) 
( )* *1 / ,iPI PX T e= +                                (4.6) 
,
d s
i iI I e=                      (4.7) 
.
d s
i iX X=           (4.8) 
 
The levels of nominal income in the two regions, ( ,iY *Y ), the price of (all) 
domestically produced goods in the two regions, ( iP , *P ), the proportional tariff, ( iT , *T ), 
and subsidy rates, ( iS , *S ), applied to imports and exports in the two regions, and the 
exchange rate, ( e ), expressed in units of country i ‘s currency per unit of the rest-of-the 
world’s currency, are the exogenous variables of  the model. 
Income elasticities, 1f  and 1g , and cross-price elasticities of demand, 3f  and 3g , are 
expected to be positive.8 However, the own-price elasticities of demand, 2f  and 2g , are 
assumed to be negative. In the n-country, the symmetry between the import demand equation 
(4.1) and the export demand equation (4.2) disappears.9 
The Perfect Substitutes Model is the alternative model to the imperfect substitutes 
model. There are some reasons to implement this model in empirical studies. Some traded 
                                                
8
 For aggregate imports or exports, the possibilities of inferior goods and of domestic complements for imports 
are typically excluded. 
9
 This is because a country’s total imports face competition only from domestic producers; whereas a country’s 
total exports face competition not only from domestic producers in the importing region but also from third 
country exporters to that region. 
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industrial goods may be closer substitutes than the (imperfect) price statistics would suggest.10 
There may be insights about price and income elasticities for imports and exports that emerge 
from a perfect substitutes framework that do not when goods are assumed to be imperfect 
substitutes. Goldstein and Khan (1984) also emphasize a reasonable argument for the 
implementation of the Perfect Substitutes Model: 
“First, despite many man-made impediments to arbitrage such as tariffs, quotas, and special 
preferential trading relationships, there is no denying that there are homogenous commodities 
(wheat, copper, sugar, etc.) that are traded on organized international commodity markets at 
a common price(net of transportation and interest costs and expressed in terms of a common 
currency). For such “standard” commodities, a framework is needed where demands and 
supplies do not depend on price differentials between domestic and foreign goods.”    
 
 
( ), ,i i iD l P Y=
                               
1 0,l <
      
2 0,l >
                                            (4.9) 
( ), ,i i iS n P F=
                              
1 0,n >
    
2 0,n <
                                           (4.10) 
,i i iI D S= −
                                                                                                              (4.11) 
,i i iX S D= −
                                 (4.12) 
,i i i wPI P PX eP= = =
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           (4.15) 
.w wD S=
                    (4.16) 
 
iD  is the total quantity of traded goods demanded in country i ; iS  is the supply of 
traded goods produced in country i ; iI  and iX  are the quantities of  country i ‘s imports and 
                                                
10
 It is possible that international differences in the methodology of constructing price statistics (e.g. weighting 
patterns, survey methods, and index number formulae) can lead to observed international price differences for a 
given good or bundle of goods that understate the true degree of substitutability.  
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exports; , ,i i iPI PX P  and wP  are the import, export, domestic, and world prices of traded 
goods; wD  and wS  are the world demand and supply of traded goods; and iY  and iF  are 
income and factor costs in country i in this perfect substitutes model. 
Goldstein and Khan (1976) use the simplest import demand function that relates the 
quantity of imports demanded by a country to the ratio of import prices to domestic prices and 
to the level of real income in that country.11 In terms of logarithms, the equation can be 
specified as follows: 
 
0 1 2log log log ,
d
t t tM P Y uα α α= + + +                                                          (4.17) 
where, 
 
M =quantity of imports in period t, 
P =ratio of import prices ( PM ) to domestic prices ( PD ) in period t, that is, 
,t
PMP t
PD
=  
Y =level of GNP in constant prices in period t, 
u is an error term, and the superscript d signifies demand. 
One reason why the import demand equation is usually specified in logarithm form is 
that this form allows imports to react proportionally to a rise and fall in the explanatory 
variables; that is, on the assumption of constant elasticities, the logarithmic form avoids the 
problem of changes in the elasticities as import quantities change (for a discussion, see Khan 
and Ross (1975)). 
Murray and Ginman (1976) estimate a relatively simple demand function for imports 
for 14 countries, with a view of distinguishing between the cyclical and trend influences on 
the quantity of imports. The traditional formulation of an import demand equation relates the 
quantity of imports demanded by country i to the ratio of import prices to domestic prices, and 
                                                
11
 The authors assume that imports are a substitute for domestic goods. Their apprroach has similarities with 
Houthakker and Magee (1969) and Leamer and Stern (1970). 
  31 
domestic real income. This presupposes that the demand function is homogenous of degree of 
zero in prices and nominal income. In log-linear terms the estimating equation generally has 
the following form: 
 
0 1 2log log ,
d
it it it tM P Y uα α α= + + +                                                            (4.18) 
 
where, 
 
iM =quantity of imports of country i 
iP =unit-value of imports of the country i deflated by the domestic price level 
iY =real income of country i 
Stern et al. (1979) analyze the U.S. aggregate import and exports, based upon 
quarterly data for the period 1956:3 – 1976:2. The authors, first, focus on the determinants of 
the prices of the U.S. imports and exports. Second, they estimate import prices in the 
estimating equation for real imports and the export prices in the equation for real exports, 
together with the other important determining variables. The model for import prices ( mP ) is:  
 
( ), , , , ,m m f d d fP P P ER P NP NP=                                                   (4.19) 
 
Where, fP is the foreign home - market price taken as a proxy for the foreign currency export 
price, ER is the exchange rate in units of foreign currency per U.S. dollar, dP  is the price of 
competing U.S. domestic goods, and dNP and fNP  are U.S. and foreign nonprice (capacity – 
type) variables that may influence import prices. The model for real import demand ( )M is: 
 
( )ˆ, , , ,d d m dM M Y P P NP=                          (4.20) 
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Where, dY  is U.S. real GNP, ˆ mP  is the estimated price of imports based on equation (4.19), 
and dP and dNP  are as defined above.  The models of export prices and real export demand 
are more or less symmetric with those for imports just noted. 
Bond (1987) distinguishes five developing country regions and five commodity 
groups. The demand and supply equations for five regions and the first four commodity 
groupings are based on the equations used by Goldstein and Khan (1978). Adjustment in 
export demand to changing market conditions occur within a period of one year, adjustment in 
export supply allows for the possibility of delayed adjustment beyond one year. In the demand 
equation, commodity k is differentiated by its regional source of supply. Commodity exports 
of different regions are treated as imperfect substitutes in Bond’s study. 
For the export demand side the world demand for exports of commodity k from 
developing country region R is specified in log-linear form as follows:                                                   
0 1 2ln ln ln ,
k
k R
kR
PXXD YWPWα α α
 
= + + 	

 
              (4.21)           
       
where, 
 
k
RXD = the quantity of exports of commodity k demanded from region R 
k
RPX = the export price of commodity k from region R 
kPW =the average price of commodity k in international markets 
YW =the real income in importing countries. 
 
Because equation (4.21) is specified in logarithms, 1α  is the elasticity of world 
demand for region R’s exports of the kth commodity with respect to the divergence between 
region R’s export price of the kth commodity and the average world price, and 2α is the 
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elasticity of export demand for commodity k with respect to global real income. It is expected 
that 1α will be negative and 2α will be positive.    
The supply of exports of commodity k from region R is specified as a log-linear 
function of current and lagged ratios of the export price of commodity k to domestic price 
levels in producing countries in region R, an index of productive capacity in region and 
supply shocks: 
 
1
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1
ln ln ln ln ln ,
k k
k R R
R R R
R R R R
PX PXXS Y SS tP E P Eβ β β β β β−
− −
   
= + + + + + 	  	

  
 
 
 
(4.22)    
 
where, 
 
k
RXS = the quantity of exports of commodity k supplied from region R 
RP =the domestic price level in producing countries in region R, in local currency 
RE =the exchange rates of currencies of producing countries, in U.S. dollars per unit 
of local currency 
Y =an index of overall proactive capacity in region R 
RSS =supply shocks in region R 
t =a trend term that reflects long-run changes that affect the supply of exports of 
commodity k. 
     
Equation (4.22) embodies the notion that exporters increase their supply of exports as 
the price of exports rises relative to domestic prices. The lagged price variable allows for the 
possibility of delayed supply adjustment beyond the period of one year. Exports of 
commodity k are also expected to increase as productive capacity in region R increases. RSS  
reflects other factors that influence exports from region R; 1β  and 2β  are region R’s price 
elasticity and lagged price elasticity of export supply, respectively, and 3β  is the elasticity 
  34 
with respect to productive capacity. It is expected that the sign of elasticities 1β , 2β  and 3β  
will be positive. Normalizing the equation for the price of exports in region R yields the 
following equation: 
 
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln .
k
k k R
R R R R R R
R R
PXPX b b XS b P E b b Y b SS b tP E
−
− −
 
= + + + + + + 	

 
              
 
(4.23)           
 
  
The normalized coefficients are related to the structural parameters in the following way: 
 
 
0 3 51 2 4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
, , , , , , .b b b b b b bβ β ββ β ββ β β β β β β= − = = = = = =  
 
 
Since 1β , 2β  and 3β  are positive, it is expected that 1b >0, 2b >0, 3b <0, and 4b <0. 
   
  
 
Brada et al. (1997) develop a model of the trade balance, which views imports and 
domestically-produced goods as imperfect substitutes and provide a simple theoretical 
framework for researchers concerned with the effects of the exchange rate on trade flows. 
Using the popular two-country model of trade, the model starts with the assumption that the 
quantity of imported goods demanded depends on output and the relative price of imported 
goods; 
( ),d d d dI I Y r=                                                                       (4.24) 
( ),w w w wI I Y r=                                                                      (4.25) 
( )ddd YRPXXX ,=                                                              (4.26) 
( )wwww YRPXXX ,=                                                        (4.27) 
wd XI =                                                                   (4.28) 
dw XI =                                                                (4.29) 
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( ) ( )dww IRPXRERIRPXB ⋅⋅⋅=                                       (4.30) 
 
Then the reduced-form equation is written as 
 
 ( )wd YYRERBB ,,=                                                   (4.31) 
 
where, 
 
    
d
I = the quantity of foreign goods imported 
   
d
Y = the level of domestic real income measured in domestic industrial production 
   
d
r = the relative price of imported goods 
    
wI = the quantity of domestic goods exported 
    
wY = the real income in the rest of the world 
    
w
r = the relative price of imports abroad 
   
dX = the supply of domestic country exportables 
   
w
X = the supply of foreign country exportables 
  ( )wRPX I• = the value of exports 
  ( )w dRER RPX I• • = the value of imports 
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 ( ) dw PPERER ⋅=   www PPXRPX =  
Equation (4.31) represents a long-run relationship that assumes sufficient time for domestic 
and world trade, consumption and production to adjust to changes in the exchange rate. 
Doganlar (2002) examines the impact of exchange rate volatility on the exports of 
Turkey, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The author estimates a standard 
export demand equation augmented by an exchange rate volatility term.  
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0 1 2 3ln ln ln ,t t t t tX FY RP V eα α α α= + + + +               (4.32) 
 
 
tX =  real export (nominal export / export price index) 
tFY = foreign economic activity (industrial production in industrialized countries) 
tRP = relative prices (home export price index / industrial countries’ export price   
 index) 
tV = proxy for exchange rate uncertainty. 
 
4.2 Data and the Variables Used in the Estimations 
For our analysis we use data for years 1980-2001 for more than 150 countries and 
more than 2000 country-year observations. Panel data estimation procedure is utilized for the 
regression equations. The panel is unbalanced due to missing observation points for separate 
nations in different time periods. Some small countries do not appear in the panel due to the 
non availability of their data. The data set is obtained from the World Bank and the key 
variables of the study are Turkey’s imports from and exports to other countries, real bilateral 
exchange rates (RER) and GDP levels in Dollars.  These variables are in logarithmic form. 
In order to control for differences in the size of each trading partner’s economy, our 
models include a variable that measures the level of income. The coefficient on this variable 
is expected to be positive reflecting the notion that an increase in domestic income will 
stimulate imports yielding positive income elasticity.  
In order to control for fluctuations in relative prices among trading partners, and its 
effect on export and import demand the real exchange rate between Turkey and each country, 
RER, was computed using the constructed values of E, P, and PW as RER = (E* P) / PW, 
where E is the nominal exchange rate (foreign currency units per TL), P is the domestic price 
  37 
index, and PW is the price index of the foreign country. Price indices are taken as the 
consumer price indices (CPI). Since the base year for CPIs is 1995, the same year is selected 
as the base year for the real exchange rate variable.  
 Besides, two dummy variables are included into the models. The first one is for the 
customs union period (cu) that takes the value of 1 for the years between 1996 and 2001 and 
zero otherwise. Another dummy variable is introduced to distinguish the 14 EU countries 
(deu) from other countries in the sample. Belgium and Luxembourg is considered as one 
country for the reason that data on Turkey’s bilateral trade with the two countries exists in a 
combined form.  Their inclusion is motivated by capturing the structural shifts with respect to 
both the CU period and the EU countries.  
Income and price variables are used interactively with the (cu) and the (deu*cu) 
variables to test whether the change in trade policy brought about an additional structural 
change in export supply and import demand in Turkey. Interactive income variables are 
(cu*lgdp), (cu*lgdpt), (deucu*lgdp), (deucu*lgdpt); and interactive price variables are 
(cu*lrer), and (deucu*lrer). We also have crises dummies to capture the effects of the 1994 
and the 2001 crises and the Marmara earthquake that occurred in 1999. 
As measures of governance, we use the indices of political stability, voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. The estimates for all these six governance variables have been compiled by 
Kaufmann et al. (2002) covering 175 countries in 2000/01 based on an analysis of wide-
ranging data sources comprised of both polls and surveys.12 The values of all these variables, 
described in more detail below, are converted into a range 0 to 5 where greater values indicate 
better governance. Several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the 
                                                
12
 Since the values of these six dimensions of governance are estimated only for 2001we also use these values for 
other years. 
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government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or 
violent means, including terrorism are combined to label political stability. Voice and 
accountability includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political 
process, civil liberties and political rights. Government effectiveness combines perceptions of 
the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to policies into a single grouping. Regulatory quality includes 
the measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. Rule of Law includes 
several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of the society. Control of corruption measures perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. 
4.3 Methodology and Models 
In order to analyze the effects of trade in both a time-series and cross-section context, 
as well as to take advantage of available data, a panel data set is used. A longitudinal, or 
panel, data set is one that follows a given sample of individuals over time, and thus provides 
multiple observations on each individual in the sample. Panel data sets for economic research 
possess several major advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets. 
First, they usually give the researcher a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of 
freedom and reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables – hence improving the 
efficiency of econometric estimates. 
Second and more important, longitudinal data allow a researcher to analyze a number 
of important economic questions that cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or time-series 
data sets. Besides the advantage that panel data allow us to construct and test more 
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complicated behavioral models than purely cross-sectional or time-series data, the use of 
panel data also provides a means of resolving or reducing the magnitude of a key econometric 
problem that often arises in empirical studies, namely, the often-heard assertion that the real 
reason one finds (or does not find) certain effects is because of omitted (mismeasured, not 
observed) variables that are correlated with explanatory variables (Hsiao, 1986, p.3). The 
basic panel data regression model can be written as 
'
it i it ity xα β ε= + +                             (4.33) 
 
 
There are K regressors in itx , not including the constant term. The individual effect 
is iα , which is taken to be constant over time t and specific to the individual cross-sectional 
unit i. As it stands, this model is a classical regression model. If we take the iα ’s to be the 
same across all units, then ordinary least squares provides consistent and efficient estimates of 
α and β . There are two basic frameworks used to generalize this model. The fixed effects 
approach takes iα to be a group specific constant term in the regression model. The random 
effects approach specifies that iα is a group specific disturbance, similar to itε except that for 
each group, there is but a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period 
(Greene, 1993 p.560).  
A common formulation of the fixed effects model assumes that differences across 
units can be captured in differences in the constant term. Thus, in (4.33), each iα is an 
unknown parameter to be estimated. Let iy and iX  be the T observations for the ith unit, and 
let iε  be associated 1T ×  vector of disturbances. Then we may write (4.33) as 
i i i iy i Xα β ε= + +                    (4.34) 
 
 
We used the fixed effects methodology in our study. There are two basic conditions 
under which a fixed effects regression model would be the most appropriate method to 
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estimate a panel data set. The first condition is satisfied if the unobservable factors that 
differentiate cross-section units are best characterized as parametric shifts of the regression 
function. This implies that a separate intercept is required for each individual in the sample. 
Given the nature of the cross-section units under investigation in this analysis, this condition 
is likely to hold. The second condition is satisfied if a relatively large proportion of the 
population is represented in the sample. This is most likely true in our analysis since the 
sample includes information on nearly all potential trading partners of Turkey under 
investigation. 
Since our panel is made up of time series observations over the major trading partners 
of Turkey that are brought together both through a membership of the EU and geographical 
(or regional) designation, fixed effects model for the estimation of both the export and import 
functions is utilized.13 Then, to capture the possible trade effects of the CU on the Turkish 
economy the fixed effects methodology is used. 
Moreover, for the appropriateness of the choice of the fixed effects methodology we 
first test whether the fixed effects are statistically significant. The restricted residual sums of 
squares being that of OLS on the pooled model and the unrestricted residual sums of squares 
being that of the fixed effects regression are compared in F-test. The test statistics is based on 
an F- distribution with (N-1) and (NT-N-K) degrees of freedom, where K is the number of 
regressors besides the dummy variables representing the fixed effects. Our results show that 
the fixed effect is appropriate. 
Secondly, we performed Hausman Tests based on Hausman (1978). The Haussman 
statistic tests for the correlation between the individual effects and explanatory variables. The 
null hypothesis of the Haussman (1978) test is that, assuming that both OLS and GLS are 
consistent, OLS is inefficient, the alternative being OLS is consistent but GLS is not.  
                                                
13
 For an overview of this debate, see Erlat (1997). 
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Rejection of the null hypothesis thus constitutes evidence against the random effects model 
(see, for example, Hsiao [1986], Greene [1993] or Baltagi [1995]). In every set of estimates 
except one, the basic import equation, the Hausman statistic rejects the random effects 
specification, suggesting that unobserved time-invariant country heterogeneity does influence 
the exports and imports of Turkey.  Therefore, we reject the random effects methodology 
based on the Hausman Tests we performed. 
Since fixed effects model cannot estimate the effect of any time-invariant variable, the 
political stability and governance terms are not included in the fixed effects formulation. 
Though econometrically inferior, we also perform OLS estimations to capture the effects of 
these variables.  
 The regression models are presented, and the results based on both the fixed effects 
and the OLS methodology are examined in Chapter 5 to interpret the CU effects on the 
Turkish foreign trade with the world and especially with the EU. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter introduces the model specifications and continues with the econometric 
results and discussions. Designing the models for empirical investigation of the effects of the 
CU on the patterns of Turkey’s trade with the world we use the framework developed by 
Neyapti et al. (2003). The export and import equations are presented in this chapter, and are 
followed by the results of the estimations and discussion of the major findings from these 
estimations.  
Following Goldstein and Khan (1976); Murray and Ginman (1976); Stern et al. 
(1979), Goldstein and Khan (1984); and Brada et al. (1997), and the models discussed in the 
previous section, we form the baseline export and import equations, (5.1) and (5.4). Then, we 
extend these base models with relevant explanatory variables to see the effects of the customs 
union on Turkish trade with the equations (5.2) and (5.3) for the Turkish exports and with the 
equations (5.5) and (5.6) for the Turkish imports.           
 
( ) ( )0 1 2ln ln lnit i it itXT gdp rerα α α= + + ……………………………….               (5.1) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln *it i it it itXT gdp rer cu deu cuα α α α α= + + + +    …………                           (5.2) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln *it i it it itXT gdp rer cu deu cuα α α α α= + + + +  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 6 7 8*ln * ln *ln *lnit it it itcu gdp cu rer deucu gdp deucu rerα α α α+ + + +  …..                 (5.3)
  
 
 
( ) ( )0 1 2ln ln lnit i it itMT gdpT rerβ β β= + +   ………………………………..                          (5.4) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln *it i it it itMT gdpT rer cu deu cuβ β β β β= + + + +  ……..…                            (5.5) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln *it i it it it itMT gdpT rer cu deu cuβ β β β β= + + + +  
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 6 7 8* ln * ln * ln * lnit it it itcu gdpT cu rer deucu gdpT deucu rerβ β β β+ + + +  ...               (5.6) 
 
Table 5.1 presents the estimations of models (5.1) through (5.6). The fixed-effects 
model is used in the panel data estimation of these equations using cross-section weights. 
Estimations are carried out with the Eviews Software, Version 3.1.14  Selecting cross-section 
weights, Eviews estimates a feasible generalized least squares (GLS) specification assuming 
the presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity. 
The models (5.1) and (5.4) are the traditional formulations of export and import 
equations, respectively. The fundamental export equation (5.1) relates the income of the 
partner countries and the exchange rate; while the import equation (5.4) combines the 
domestic income that is the income of Turkey, and the exchange rate. Following the 
Keynesian line of argument, it is expected that an increase in domestic income will stimulate 
imports yielding positive income elasticity. 
Table 5.1 shows that the sign of (ln rer) is negative in export equations and positive in 
import equations meaning an increase in real price of foreign exchange is expected to improve 
the trade balance. The estimated price elasticities are significantly different from zero at the 1 
per cent level in all of the equations. The calculated price elasticities in import equations are 
smaller than (in absolute value) the calculated price elasticities in export equations. We have 
observed that the Turkish bilateral exports and imports are price inelastic; since the elasticities 
are less than one in absolute values. 
Positive sign of (ln gdp) means that the relationship between the trade balance and 
world income is pro-cyclical. The estimated income elasticities are significantly different 
from zero at the 1 per cent level in all of the export equations meaning that the Turkish 
                                                
14
 EViews is a registered trademark of Quantitative Micro Software, 4521 Campus Drive, Suite 336, Irvine CA, 
92612. 
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exports are income elastic. In import equations coefficients of income variables have positive 
signs. The coefficient of (ln gdpT) is 1.75 in equation (5.4). In equation (5.5) and (5.6), the 
coefficient of (ln gdpT) is 1.52.  
The first observation from the examination of the regressions (5.2) and (5.5) that  the 
Custom Union Agreement has had a positive and significant impact both on the Turkish 
exports and imports and on the direction of trade.  The coefficients of the (cu) dummy are 
positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent level in these equations, 0.58 and 0.23 
respectively. This indicates a significant increase in the trade volumes of Turkey after the 
Customs Union Agreement came into effect. The analysis of the (deu*cu) dummy variable in 
both equations gives interesting results. The coefficient of (deu*cu) dummy is negative and 
significant at 1 per cent level (-0.26) in equation (5.2). This shows that the increase in exports 
to the EU is less than the average increase in Turkey’s exports after the Customs Union 
Agreement. We have the opposite situation in import equation (5.5). The coefficient of 
(deu*cu) dummy is positive and significant at 1 per cent level (0.23) in equation (5.5) 
displaying the increase in imports from the EU is more than the average increase in Turkey’s 
exports after the Customs Union Agreement. 
The third equations in export and import models, (5.3) and (5.6) are intended to test 
the additional structural and behavioral changes in export supply and import demand in 
Turkey after the Agreement. The Customs Union brought new regulations in the trade of 
Turkey those are discussed in Chapter 2 of the study. Therefore, we aim to evaluate the 
responsiveness of the Turkish exports and imports to possible changes. 
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Table 5.1: Fixed-Effect Results: 
Variables / Model (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) 
LNGDP 2,10*** 1,76*** 1,79***    
 (0,04) (0,05) (0,05)    
LNGDPT    1,75*** 1,52*** 1,52*** 
    (0,03) (0,04) (0,14) 
LNRER -0,67*** -0,44*** -0,40*** 0,28*** 0,29*** 0,37*** 
 (0,06) (0,07) (0,08) (0,06) (0,06) (0,06) 
CU  0,58*** 3,44***  0,23*** 13,71* 
  (0,05) (0,38)  (0,04) (7,03) 
DEUCU  -0,26*** -1,74  0,23*** -2,13 
  (0,06) (1,16)  (0,05) (10,85) 
CULNGDP   -0,12***    
   (0,02)    
CULNGDPT      -0,52* 
      (0,27) 
CULNRER   0,17   -0,48*** 
   (0,18)   (0,15) 
DEUCULNGDP   0,06    
   (0,05)    
DEUCULNGDPT      0,09 
      (0,42) 
DEUCULNRER   -0,99***   -0,09 
  
    (0,33)     (0,27) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 
# of cross-sections used 155 155 155 156 156 156 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 2193 2193 2193 2065 2065 2065 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.       
**    
reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      
reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors           
  
We performed Wald Tests (see Table 5.2) based on F distribution for significance of 
the sum of the coefficients estimated for the interactive variables in equations (5.3) and (5.6). 
All of the null hypotheses, but the hypothesis (lnrer+culnrer=0), are rejected at 1 per cent 
significance level for equation (5.3). Since the coefficient of the (cu*lgdp) is -0.12 and the 
coefficient of the (deucu*lgdp) is 0.06 we may say that the responsiveness of the Turkish 
exports to income changes declined slightly. However, we still have positive and significant 
impact of the income levels of the trading partners of Turkey. The coefficient of the (cu*lrer) 
is 0.17 but the coefficient is neither significant at 5 nor 10 per cent significance levels. 
However, the coefficient of the (deucu*lrer) is -0.99 and the coefficient is statistically 
significant at 1 per cent level. Our results maintain the sensitivity of export demand to price 
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changes. Moreover, following the Customs Union Agreement, demand for Turkish exports in 
the EU countries have become more price sensitive. 
For the equation (5.6), neither the null hypotheses for the price variables 
(lnrer+culnrer=0) nor (lnrer+culnrer+deuculnrer=0) rejected at 10 per cent significance level. 
In other words, we can not reject the hypotheses that the sum of the price coefficients is in 
fact zero. Since the coefficient of the (cu*lgdpt) is -0.52 and the coefficient of the 
(deucu*lgdpt) is 0.09 we may say that the responsiveness of the Turkish imports to income 
changes declined slightly. However, we still have positive and significant impact of the 
income level of the Turkey’s income level. The coefficient of the (cu*lrer) is -0.48 and the 
coefficient is statistically significant at 1 per cent level. However, the coefficient of the 
(deucu*lrer) is -0.09 but the coefficient is neither significant at 5 nor 10 per cent significance 
levels. We thus observe a picture such that the price responsiveness of imports significantly 
declined during the CU period to an extent that import demand became insensitive to price 
changes.   
The Turkish economy has suffered economic crises in 1994 and in 2001. Besides these 
crises, The Marmara Earthquake that occurred in 1999 led to an important decline in the 
overall demand. One of the direct indicators of the crisis over the financial markets was the 
rapid rate of depreciation of the TL. Turkey declared the surrender of the pegged exchange 
rate system on February 2001, thereby letting the exchange rates to free float. Therefore, we 
are motivated to examine the impact on the Turkey’s bilateral trade of the economic and 
financial crises that occurred in the Turkish economy. We included three crises dummies for 
each of these events into the exports and import equations (see table 5.3). 
Due to an appreciation of the Turkish Lira (see Chapter 3) imports increased rapidly, 
exports slowed down, and the current account deficits reached to significant levels before the 
1994 crisis. What followed was a major devaluation of Turkish lira and a financial collapse. 
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The government consequently introduced a stabilization and structural adjustment program on 
April 5, 1994, the core of which consisted of a fiscal retrenchment to reduce inflation and to 
improve the external balance. The dummy for the 1994 crisis is positive and statistically 
significant at 1 per cent level in all of the equations except the model (5.4). As a result of 
Turkey's currency crisis in 1994, output fell dramatically, inflation rose to three-digit levels, 
the Central Bank lost half of its reserves, and the exchange rate (against the U.S. dollar) 
depreciated by more than fifty per cent in the first three months of the year. 
The dummy for the 2001 crisis is positive and statistically significant at 5 per cent 
level in model (5.5). In models (5.1) through (5.4) we observe positive and significant (at 1 
per cent level) coefficient for the 2001 crisis dummy. However, the significance disappears in 
the equation (5.6). Therefore, the significance in the change in imports is not robust. The 
latest crisis of February 2001 was unprecedented in intensity. Since the month in which the 
devaluation occurred was February, then significant positive impact for the rest of the 2001 
was expected due to adjustment effects of devaluation. The interpretation of the 1999 
earthquake is different. The coefficient is only significant for the models (5.1) and (5.6). The 
coefficient is negative in the model (5.6) and it is reasonable due to a decrease in income level 
of Turkey, the major effect of the Marmara Earthquake. 
Table 5.2: Wald test results for the significance of the sum of the coefficients in  
    Table 5.1, Equations (5.3) and (5.6). 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
Export lnrer+culnrer=0 -0,23 1,92 0,166 
 lnrer+culnrer+deuculnrer=0 -1,23 18,51*** 0,000 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 1,67 1315,35*** 0,000 
 lngdp+culngdp+deuculngdp=0 1,73 725,89*** 0,000 
     
Import lnrer+culnrer=0 -0,11 0,69 0,405 
 lnrer+culnrer+deuculnrer=0 -0,21 0,79 0,375 
 lngdpT+culngdpT=0 1,00 13,92*** 0,000 
 lngdpT+culngdpT+deuculngdpT=0 1,09 11,55*** 0,001 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 5.3: Fixed-Effect Results with crises periods: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables / Model (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) 
LNGDP 2,05*** 1,74*** 1,76***    
 (0,04) (0,05) (0,05)    
LNGDPT    1,74*** 1,51*** 1,51*** 
    (0,03) (0,04) (0,04) 
LNRER -0,71*** -0,51*** -0,45*** 0,25*** 0,24*** 0,32*** 
 (0,07) (0,07) (0,08) (0,06) (0,06) (0,06) 
CU  0,57*** 3,50***  0,25*** 6,94 
  (0,05) (0,41)  (0,04) (17,21) 
DEUCU  -0,28*** -1,92*  0,21*** -5,88 
  (0,06) (1,15)  (0,05) (10,88) 
CULNGDP   -0,12***    
   (0,02)    
CULNGDPT      -0,26 
      (0,66) 
CULNRER   0,05   -0,46*** 
   (0,18)   (0,16) 
DEUCULNGDP   0,06    
   (0,04)    
DEUCULNGDPT      0,23 
      (0,42) 
DEUCULNRER   -0,98***   -0,08 
   (0,32)   (0,28) 
D1994 0,14*** 0,27*** 0,27*** 0,08 0,17*** 0,16*** 
 (0,05) (0,06) (0,06) (0,05) (0,05) (0,05) 
D1999 0,11** -0,02 -0,04 0,04 -0,07 -0,12* 
 (0,05) (0,06) (0,06) (0,05) (0,05) (0,06) 
D2001 0,54*** 0,39*** 0,39*** 0,33*** 0,13** 0,11 
  
(0,06) (0,06) (0,06) (0,05) (0,06) (0,18) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 
# of cross-sections used 155 155 155 156 156 156 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 2193 2193 2193 2065 2065 2065 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.       
**    
reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      
reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors           
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Table 5.4: Wald test results for the significance of the sum of the coefficients for  
     Table 5.3, Equations (5.3) and (5.6). 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
Export lnrer+culnrer=0 -0,4 5,46** 0,019 
 lnrer+culnrer+deuculnrer=0 -1,38 23,77*** 0,000 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 1,64 1183,43*** 0,000 
 lngdp+culngdp+deuculngdp=0 1,71 689,00*** 0,000 
     
Import lnrer+culnrer=0 -0,14 0,92 0,338 
 lnrer+culnrer+deuculnrer=0 -0,21 0,72 0,396 
 lngdpT+culngdpT=0 1,25 3,59* 0,058 
 lngdpT+culngdpT+deuculngdpT=0 1,48 4,34** 0,037 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
 
OLS estimations are utilized to investigate the effects of the indices of political 
stability, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption since we cannot estimate the effect of any time-invariant variable 
with fixed effects methodology (see Table 4 and Table 5 in Appendix).  
We observe positive and significant relationship with the Turkish exports and political 
stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. However, we did 
not find any significant relationship for voice and accountability, and regulatory quality. For 
the import equations, we see that all of the six measures of governance have positive impact 
on the Turkish imports. These regressions show that the procurement in the governance 
measures of the trading partners of Turkey have increased both the Turkish exports and 
imports. 
These pooled models may be biased due to the omission of fixed effects. However, 
when the fixed effect and the pooled model give different results, it is often interpreted as a 
sign of misspecification of the pooled model (see Baltagi, 1995, section 10.6.2.). It also 
appears that the two models give the same qualitative answers for the income and price effects 
on the Turkish exports and imports. To confirm the robustness of our estimation results, the 
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regressions reported above are also estimated separately for the EU and Non-EU countries. 
The results of these estimations are reported in Table 5.5.   
Table 5.5 shows that the results of the regressions separately for the EU and Non-EU 
countries support the conclusions of the Table 5.1 and 5.3. A significant increase in the price 
elasticity of exports to the EU after the CU and a significant decrease in the price elasticity of 
imports from the EU after the CU are observed in the regressions for the EU sample only. The 
regressions without EU countries are also show a significant decrease in the price elasticity of 
imports from Non-EU countries after the CU. 
We also performed regressions for the regional and income sub-samples. Countries are 
classified as low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income, and high-income for 
their per capita income; and Americas, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North 
Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa for their geographical locations (see Table 6 and Table 7 in 
Appendix for the country classifications). 
For Middle East and North Africa countries we observe that (see Table 14 and 15 in 
Appendix) the real exchange rate does not have significant impact for both the Turkish 
exports to and imports from Middle East and North Africa countries. However, when we 
consider the (cu*lrer) variable in the complete export equation then the negative effect of the 
real exchange rate is captured as expected. Income effects are as expected, and the regressions 
with crises periods show the negative effects of the Marmara Earthquake on the Turkish 
imports. 
In the regressions for the Sub-Saharan Africa Countries we see that the effect of the 
real exchange rate on the Turkish exports to the Sub-Saharan Africa Countries is stronger than 
those on the Turkish imports from those countries. The (cu*lrer) variable is not statistically 
significant in both export and import equations. When we focus on the crises periods, we only 
see the significant negative effects of the 1994 crisis on the Turkish exports.  
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For the region of Americas Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix show that the income 
elasticities of the Turkish exports have declined in the CU period and the income elasticities 
of the Turkish imports are increased in the CU period. We do not observe any significant 
effect of the real exchange rates on neither the Turkish exports nor imports after the CU 
period. The positive effect of the 1994 crisis on the Turkish imports from Americas countries 
is also significant.  
We see that the income elasticity of the Turkish exports is decreased in the CU period 
for the Asian countries. For the income elasticity of the Turkish imports we observe contrary 
results. We observe that the variable (cu*lgdpT) is not statistically significant for the 
complete import model in the regressions without crises periods. When we look at the sum of 
the coefficients of (lgdpT) and (cu*lgdpT) it is observed that the income effect on the Turkish 
imports has disappeared. However, we do not observe the same in the regressions with crises 
periods. We also discern the negative effects of the earthquake on the Turkish imports from 
the Asian countries like Middle East and North Africa Countries. 
Income elasticity of the Turkish exports to Europe and Central Asia countries has 
increased after the CU, while we observe the opposite for the income elasticity of imports. 
However, the Customs Union Agreement has a noticeable impact on the Turkish imports from 
Europe and Central Asian countries. This comes from the significant and positive coefficient 
of the (cu) variable, which is 16.09. This shows that the importance of the CU on the Turkish 
imports from the EU. The most remarkable impact of the CU on the foreign trade of the 
Turkey is in the Turkish imports from the EU. The only significant crisis dummy is the one 
that stands for the 1994 crisis in the basic export equation, and it has a negative effect. 
We observe that the Turkish exports to the low-income countries have increased after 
the CU. However, price elasticities of both the Turkish exports and imports have decreased 
after the CU. We have similar observation for the income elasticities with these income group 
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countries. The price elasticity of the Turkish exports to the lower-middle-income, to the 
upper-middle-income group, and to the high-income group is increased after the CU. The 
other variables behave in the same way as we observed in the regression of the low-income 
countries. Our results for the crises dummies do not show robust results. 
We tried to do a regression analysis in this section. It is thus possible to conclude that 
there was a significant effect of the Custom Union on Turkish trade; both exports and imports 
increased during this period. Furthermore, changes have occurred in income and price 
elasticities of both exports and imports after the Custom Union.  
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Table 5.5: Regression results using only EU and non-EU samples: 
Regressions for the EU sample only:          
Variables / Model (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
LNGDP 1,83*** 1,44*** 1,34***    
 (0,05) (0,07) (0,07)    
LNGDPT    1,76*** 1,41*** 1,38*** 
    (0,04) (0,04) (0,05) 
LNRER -0,62*** 0,00 0,43** 0,19 0,56*** 0,72*** 
 (0,16) (0,17) (0,18) (0,12) (0,10) (0,11) 
CU  0,49*** 2,89***  0,51*** 6,24 
  (0,06) (1,06)  (0,04) (7,09) 
CULNGDP   -0,09**    
   (0,04)    
CULNGDPT      -0,22 
      (0,27) 
CULNRER   -1,34***   -0,81*** 
      (0,29)     (0,21) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,93 0,94 0,94 0,92 0,93 0,93 
# of cross-sections used 14 14 14 14 14 14 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.       
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
  
   
  
Regressions with non-EU countries:      
Variables / Model (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
LNGDP 1,88*** 1,63*** 1,69***    
 (0,02) (0,06) (0,06)    
LNGDPT    1,68*** 1,53*** 1,56*** 
    (0,05) (0,06) (0,06) 
LNRER -0,60*** -0,45*** -0,44*** 0,21*** 0,17** 0,22*** 
 (0,07) (0,08) (0,08) (0,07) (0,07) (0,08) 
CU  0,67*** 4,15***  0,19*** 14,48* 
  (0,05) (0,42)  (0,05) (7,49) 
CULNGDP   -0,15***    
   (0,02)    
CULNGDPT      -0,55* 
      (0,29) 
CULNRER   0,21   -0,34** 
      (0,19)     (0,16) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,81 0,82 0,82 0,80 0,80 0,80 
# of cross-sections used 148 148 148 148 148 148 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 1912 1912 1912 1786 1786 1786 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.       
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
 
  54 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
On 6 March 1995, the European Union and Turkey signed agreement on Customs 
Union. Turkey’s tariffs and levies on imports of manufactured products from the European 
Union were eliminated by this agreement. Trade in agricultural products, with the exception 
of agro-industrial products, that is processed food, was excluded. Turkey would also apply 
EU’s common external tariff on imports from third countries. Finally, liberalization of 
Turkish foreign trade has gained an irrevocable momentum with the realization of substantial 
adjustments to Common Custom Tariff System with the European Union (EU) in 1996.  
 In this study, we investigate the benefits of customs union from the perspective of its 
possible associations with key trade indicators; exports and imports. Our empirical analysis 
involves estimating the effects on exports and imports of Turkey of the Customs Union 
Agreement, price and income changes, and economic crises controlling for additional 
institutional variables. The findings also support the empirical literature that imports (exports) 
are positively related to domestic income (income of the trade partners), and devaluation has a 
favorable effect on the Turkish exports. Furthermore, our results reveal that the behavior of 
Turkish exports and imports have changed after the CU period considering both income and 
price elasticities. 
 Moreover, we observe that income elasticity of both exports to and imports from all 
countries other than the EU are lower in the CU period.  On the contrary, it is found that, the 
elasticity of Turkish exports to the EU has increased after the CUA while the elasticity of 
Turkish exports to the Non-EU countries is decreased after the CU period. 
 The price elasticity of Turkish exports to the EU countries increased after the CUA. 
This indicates that Turkish exporters are faced with increased competition. Moreover, there 
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are no statistically significant differences among income elasticities of both Turkish exports 
and imports for EU and the rest of the countries.   
  There is also somewhat weak evidence that the income elasticity of imports is lower 
after CU.   The robustness of the parameters that are the interactive CU dummy variable with 
the income and price variables are observed when the other interactive and dummy variables 
are added to the regressions. 
Our results indicate that, Turkey’s liberalized trade regime allowed both the real 
exchange rate and domestic and world incomes to influence the foreign trade of Turkey. Our 
empirical investigation suggests that customs union has positive effect on both imports and 
exports of Turkey. We argue that the role of the institutional variables should not be 
underestimated when one assesses the impact of the CU. 
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Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of Turkey’s Exports During 1995-2001 (%) 
Section EU Total 
ANIMALS & ANIMAL PRODUCTS -2,58 -6,02 
VEGETABLE PRODUCTS -3,18 -0,46 
ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS 0,45 -11,02 
PREPARED FOODSTUFS -0,46 0,95 
MINERAL PRODUCTS 3,44 4,21 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 4,99 6,33 
PLASTICS & RUBBER 11,67 9,63 
HIDES & SKINS -4,41 -1,48 
WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS 0,52 7,90 
WOOD PULP PRODUCTS 11,32 11,16 
TEXTILES & TEXTILE ARTICLES 3,88 3,79 
FOOTWEAR, HEADGEAR 2,42 1,52 
ARTICLES OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS 8,23 9,92 
PEARLS, PRECIOUS OR SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES, METALS 13,45 37,23 
BASE METALS & ARTICLES THEREOF 11,68 5,58 
MACHINERY & MECHANICAL APPLICANCES 15,47 15,52 
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 27,96 25,81 
INSTRUMENTS - MEASURING, MUSICAL 9,33 47,75 
ARMS & AMMUNITION 3,73 14,02 
MISCELANEOUS 20,30 12,71 
WORKS OF ART 72,30 55,07 
Source: SIS 
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Table 4: OLS Results for Export Equations 
Variables / Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C -9,55*** -9,07*** -8,33*** -8,84*** -9,53*** -8,55*** -9,75*** 
 (0,63) (0,67) (0,67) (0,69) (0,66) (0,68) (0,67) 
LNGDP 1,05*** 1,00*** 0,96*** 1,01*** 1,04*** 0,98*** 1,07*** 
 (0,03) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03) 
LNRER -0,23* -0,08 0,02 -0,12 -0,20 -0,08 -0,29** 
 (0,14) (0,14) (0,14) (0,14) (0,14) (0,14) (0,14) 
CU 3,01*** 5,31*** 4,51*** 5,12*** 4,89*** 5,16*** 4,32*** 
 (1,05) (1,15) (1,12) (1,16) (1,13) (1,15) (1,12) 
DEUCU -2,63 -6,94 -7,08 -6,24 -4,82 -6,70 -3,27 
 (5,75) (5,71) (5,65) (5,73) (5,74) (5,69) (5,75) 
CULNGDP -0,09** -0,18** -0,15*** -0,17*** -0,17*** -0,17*** -0,14*** 
 (0,04) (0,05) (0,05) (0,05) (0,05) (0,05) (0,05) 
CULNRER 0,90** 0,71* 0,85** 0,85** 0,93** 0,81** 0,98** 
 (0,38) (0,38) (0,38) (0,38) (0,38) (0,38) (0,38) 
DEUCULNGDP 0,13 0,29 0,29 0,26 0,21 0,28 0,16 
 (0,22) (0,21) (0,21) (0,21) (0,21) (0,21) (0,22) 
DEUCULNRER -1,66 -1,54 -1,65 -1,66 -1,72 -1,63 -1,69 
 (1,59) (1,57) (1,56) (1,58) (1,58) (1,57) (1,59) 
POLINS  0,26***      
  (0,05)      
RULEOFLOW   0,42***     
   (0,05)     
CONTCORR    0,18***    
    (0,05)    
REGUAL     0,05   
     (0,07)   
GOVEFF      0,30***  
      (0,06)  
VOACCOUNT       -0,09 
              (0,05) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,56 0,54 0,55 0,53 0,54 0,54 0,54 
# of cross-sections used 155 137 142 136 142 136 145 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 2193 2100 2126 2091 2126 2094 2143 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.         
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.        
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.      
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors        
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Table 5: OLS Results for Import Equations 
Variables / Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C -7,11 -19,59*** -22,27*** -21,24*** -19,12*** -23,61*** -17,88*** 
 (5,80) (5,27) (5,14) (5,24) (5,59) (5,11) (5,53) 
LNGDPT 0,92*** 1,26*** 1,37*** 1,39*** 1,26*** 1,41*** 1,26*** 
 (0,23) (0,21) (0,20) (0,21) (0,22) (0,20) (0,22) 
LNRER -1,16*** -0,28 -0,07 -0,16 -0,54*** -0,17 -0,48** 
 (0,20) (0,19) (0,18) (0,19) (0,20) (0,18) (0,20) 
CU -23,47 -23,45 -18,44 -29,22 -20,72 -17,18 -23,64 
 (34,37) (31,63) (30,56) (31,62) (33,13) (30,79) (32,85) 
DEUCU 21,33 23,17 18,01 31,89 25,05 21,19 27,67 
 (95,45) (85,87) (83,72) (85,46) (90,75) (83,24) (90,12) 
CULNGDPT 0,87 0,88 0,69 1,1 0,77 0,64 0,88 
 (1,33) (1,22) (1,18) (1,22) (1,28) (1,19) (1,27) 
CULNRER 0,94 0,08 0,49 0,57 0,72 0,52 0,63 
 (0,58) (0,53) (0,51) (0,53) (0,56) (0,51) (0,55) 
DEUCULNGDPT -0,63 -0,78 -0,59 -1,13 -0,83 -0,73 -0,94 
 (3,68) (3,32) (3,23) (3,30) (3,50) (3,21) (3,48) 
DEUCULNRER 0,44 1,00 0,66 0,40 0,17 0,37 0,21 
 (2,52) (2,26) (2,21) (2,25) (2,39) (2,19) (2,38) 
POLINS  1,36***      
  (0,07)      
RULEOFLOW   1,53***     
   (0,07)     
CONTCORR    1,29***    
    (0,07)    
REGUAL     1,08***   
     (0,09)   
GOVEFF      1,54***  
      (0,07)  
VOACCOUNT       1,02*** 
              (0,07) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,10 0,24 0,29 0,25 0,16 0,28 0,18 
# of cross-sections used 156 138 143 137 143 137 147 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 2065 1987 2009 1982 2009 1984 2023 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
       
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
       
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors        
Table 6: Classification of Economies by Income, 1999 (Source: World Bank) 
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Low-income Lower Middle-income Upper Middle-income High-income   
Afghanistan Albania American Samoa Andorra  
Angola Algeria Antigua and Barbuda Aruba  
Armenia Belarus Argentina Australia  
Azerbaijan Belize Bahrain Austria  
Bangladesh Bolivia Barbados Bahamas, The  
Benin Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Belgium  
Bhutan Bulgaria Brazil Bermuda  
Burkina Faso Cape Verde Chile Brunei  
Burundi Colombia Croatia Canada  
Cambodia Costa Rica Czech Republic Cayman Islands  
Cameroon Cuba Estonia Channel Islands  
Central African Republic Djibouti Gabon Cyprus  
Chad Dominica Grenada Denmark  
China Dominican Republic Hungary Faeroe Islands  
Comoros Ecuador Isle of Man Finland  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Korea, Rep. France  
Congo, Rep. El Salvador Lebanon French Polynesia  
Cote d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Libya Germany  
Eritrea Fiji Malaysia Greece  
Ethiopia Georgia Mauritius Greenland  
Gambia, The Guatemala Mayotte Guam  
Ghana Guyana Mexico Hong Kong, China  
Guinea Iran, Islamic Rep. Oman Iceland  
Guinea-Bissau Iraq Palau Ireland  
Haiti Jamaica Panama Israel  
Honduras Jordan Poland Italy  
India Kazakhstan Puerto Rico Japan  
Indonesia Kiribati Saudi Arabia Kuwait  
Kenya Latvia Seychelles Liechtenstein  
Korea, Dem. Rep. Lithuania Saudi Arabia Luxembourg  
Kyrgyz Republic Macedonia, FYR Seychelles Macao, China  
Lao PDR Maldives Slovak Republic Malta  
Lesotho Marshall Islands St. Kitts and Nevis Monaco  
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Table 6: Classification of Economies by Income, 1999 (Cont'd) (Source: World Bank) 
Low-income Lower Middle-income Upper Middle-income High-income   
Liberia Micronesia, Fed. Sts. St. Lucia N. Mariana Islands  
Madagascar Morocco Trinidad and Tobago Netherlands  
Malawi Namibia Turkey Netherlands Antilles  
Mali Papua New Guinea Uruguay New Caledonia  
Mauritania Paraguay Venezuela, RB New Zealand  
Moldova Peru  Norway  
Mongolia Philippines  Portugal  
Mozambique Romania  Qatar  
Myanmar Russian Federation  Singapore  
Nepal Samoa  Slovenia  
Nicaragua South Africa  Spain  
Niger Sri Lanka  Sweden  
Nigeria St. Vincent and the Grenadines  Switzerland  
Pakistan Suriname  Taiwan, China  
Rwanda Swaziland  United Arab Emirates  
Sao Tome and Principe Syrian Arab Republic  United Kingdom  
Senegal Thailand  United States  
Sierra Leone Tonga  Virgin Islands (U.S.)  
Senegal Tunisia    
Sierra Leone Ukraine    
Solomon Islands Uzbekistan    
Somalia Vanuatu    
Sudan West Bank and Gaza    
Tajikistan Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro)    
Tanzania     
Togo     
Turkmenistan     
Uganda     
Vietnam     
Yemen, Rep.     
Zambia     
Zimbabwe     
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Table 7: Classification of Economies by Region, 1999 (Source: World Bank) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East and North Africa Americas 
Angola Afghanistan Albania Algeria Antigua and Barbuda 
Benin American Samoa Andorra Bahrain Argentina 
Botswana Australia Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Aruba 
Burkina Faso Bangladesh Austria Iran, Islamic Rep. Bahamas, The 
Burundi Bhutan Azerbaijan Iraq Barbados 
Cameroon Brunei Belarus Israel Belize 
Cape Verde Cambodia Belgium Jordan Bermuda 
Central African Republic China Bosnia and Herzegovina Kuwait Bolivia 
Chad Fiji Bulgaria Lebanon Brazil 
Comoros French Polynesia Channel Islands Libya Canada 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Guam Croatia Malta Cayman Islands 
Congo, Rep. Hong Kong, China Cyprus Morocco Chile 
Cote d'Ivoire India Czech Republic Oman Colombia 
Djibouti Indonesia Denmark Qatar Costa Rica 
Equatorial Guinea Japan Estonia Saudi Arabia Cuba 
Eritrea Kiribati Faeroe Islands Syrian Arab Republic Dominica 
Ethiopia Korea, Dem. Rep. Finland Tunisia Dominican Republic 
Gabon Korea, Rep. France United Arab Emirates Ecuador 
Gambia, The Lao PDR Georgia West Bank and Gaza El Salvador 
Ghana Macao, China Germany Yemen, Rep. Grenada 
Guinea Malaysia Greece  Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau Maldives Greenland  Guyana 
Kenya Marshall Islands Hungary  Haiti 
Lesotho Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Iceland  Honduras 
Liberia Mongolia Ireland  Jamaica 
Madagascar Myanmar Isle of Man  Mexico 
Malawi N. Mariana Islands Italy  Netherlands Antilles 
Mali Nepal Kazakhstan  Nicaragua 
Mauritania New Caledonia Kyrgyz Republic  Panama 
Mauritius New Zealand Latvia  Paraguay 
Mayotte Pakistan Liechtenstein  Peru 
Mozambique Palau Lithuania  Puerto Rico 
Namibia Papua New Guinea Luxembourg  St. Kitts and Nevis 
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Table 7: Classification of Economies by Region, 1999 (Cont'd) (Source: World Bank) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East and North Africa Americas 
Niger Philippines Macedonia, FYR  St. Lucia 
Nigeria Samoa Moldova  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Rwanda Singapore Monaco  Suriname 
Sao Tome and Principe Solomon Islands Netherlands  Trinidad and Tobago 
Senegal Sri Lanka Norway  United States 
Seychelles Taiwan, China Poland  Uruguay 
Sierra Leone Thailand Portugal  Venezuela, RB 
Somalia Tonga Romania  Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
South Africa Vanuatu Russian Federation   
Sudan Vietnam Slovak Republic   
Swaziland  Slovenia   
Tanzania  Spain   
Togo  Sweden   
Uganda  Switzerland   
Zambia  Tajikistan   
Zimbabwe  Turkey   
  Turkmenistan   
  Ukraine   
  United Kingdom   
  Uzbekistan   
  Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro)   
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Table 8: Regression Results  (Americas)          
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,85*** 2,31*** 2,36***    
 (0,10) (0,14) (0,14)    
LNGDPT    1,59*** 1,64*** 1,62*** 
    (0,11) (0,13) (0,14) 
LNRER -0,76*** -0,61*** -0,57*** 0,69*** 0,68*** 0,78*** 
 (0,18) (0,18) (0,18) (0,23) (0,20) (0,22) 
CU  0,72*** 4,51***  -0,05 -48,79** 
  (0,12) (0,74)  (0,12) (19,10) 
CULNGDP   -0,15***    
   (0,03)    
CULNGDPT      1,88** 
      (0,74) 
CULNRER   0,19   -0,29 
      (0,47)     (0,47) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,77 0,79 0,78 0,79 0,79 0,80 
# of cross-sections used 34 34 34 34 34 34 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 482 482 482 448 448 448 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 10: Regression Results  (Asia)          
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,10*** 2,28*** 2,28***    
 (0,09) (0,11) (0,11)    
LNGDPT    2,47*** 2,30*** 2,43*** 
    (0,10) (0,13) (0,28) 
LNRER -0,49*** -0,65*** -0,57*** 0,17 0,11 0,33 
 (0,18) (0,18) (0,20) (0,15) (0,15) (0,39) 
CU  -0,33*** 2,88***  0,20** 50,24 
  (0,11) (0,99)  (0,10) (33,17) 
CULNGDP   -0,13***    
   (0,04)    
CULNGDPT      -1,93 
      (1,28) 
CULNRER   -0,13   -1,04 
      (0,45)     (0,89) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,86 0,86 0,86 
# of cross-sections used 27 27 27 28 28 28 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 362 362 362 356 356 356 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
    Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 11:Regression Results With Crises Periods (Asia)          
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,13*** 2,30*** 2,29***    
 (0,14) (0,11) (0,11)    
LNGDPT    2,46*** 2,32*** 2,46*** 
    (0,10) (0,13) (0,13) 
LNRER -0,49* -0,64*** -0,56*** 0,16 0,10 0,33* 
 (0,27) (0,18) (0,19) (0,14) (0,15) (0,17) 
CU  -0,31*** 2,93***  0,16* 47,71*** 
  (0,11) (0,97)  (0,09) (13,82) 
CULNGDP   -0,13***    
   (0,04)    
CULNGDPT      -1,84*** 
      (0,53) 
CULNRER   -0,08   -1,01** 
   (0,45)   (0,39) 
D1994 0,41 0,37** 0,41** 0,05 0,07 0,03 
 (0,29) (0,19) (0,19) (0,19) (0,19) (0,18) 
D1999 0,12 0,09 0,04 -0,39*** -0,34** -0,35** 
 (0,27) (0,17) (0,18) (0,15) (0,15) (0,14) 
D2001 -0,21 -0,17 -0,16 0,02 0,03 0,04 
  (0,43) (0,28) (0,28) (0,26) (0,25) (0,26) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,86 0,86 0,86 
# of cross-sections used 27 27 27 28 28 28 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 362 362 362 356 356 356 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
    Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 13:Regression Results With Crises Periods (Europe   and Central Asia) 
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 1,61*** 1,34*** 1,26***    
 (0,05) (0,06) (0,06)    
LNGDPT    1,69*** 1,41*** 1,39*** 
    (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) 
LNRER -0,31*** 0,02 0,27** 0,23** 0,29*** 0,45*** 
 (0,10) (0,11) (0,14) (0,09) (0,08) (0,10) 
CU  0,37*** -1,28***  0,43*** 16,28*** 
  (0,05) (0,48)  (0,04) (6,11) 
CULNGDP   0,06***    
   (0,02)    
CULNGDPT      -0,61*** 
      (0,24) 
CULNRER   -0,54***   -0,60*** 
   (0,20)   (0,16) 
D1994 -0,18** -0,10 -0,12 -0,01 0,09 0,08 
 (0,07) (0,08) (0,08) (0,07) (0,06) (0,06) 
D1999 -0,01 -0,01 -0,06 -0,04 -0,04 -0,03 
 (0,09) (0,09) (0,09) (0,08) (0,06) (0,06) 
D2001 0,27 0,17 0,13 0,16 -0,02 -0,03 
  (0,19) (0,19) (0,19) (0,14) (0,11) (0,11) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,84 0,85 0,85 0,91 0,91 0,91 
# of cross-sections used 39 39 39 39 39 39 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 586 586 586 582 582 582 
***  reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 15: Regression Results With Crises Periods (Middle East and North Africa) 
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,08*** 2,09*** 1,96***    
 (0,10) (0,13) (0,13)    
LNGDPT    1,37*** 1,13*** 1,13*** 
    (0,12) (0,16) (0,16) 
LNRER 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,03 0,09 0,09 
 (0,10) (0,12) (0,11) (0,18) (0,18) (0,18) 
CU  -0,01 -3,09  0,41*** -2,25 
  (0,11) (2,00)  (0,15) (37,86) 
CULNGDP   0,13    
   (0,08)    
CULNGDPT      0,10 
      (1,46) 
CULNRER   -0,78**   -0,17 
   (0,33)   (0,57) 
D1994 -0,07 -0,07 -0,09 0,01 -0,04 -0,04 
 (0,16) (0,16) (0,16) (0,23) (0,23) (0,23) 
D1999 0,05 0,04 0,02 -0,61** -0,55** -0,56** 
 (0,18) (0,18) (0,18) (0,24) (0,24) (0,24) 
D2001 0,72* 0,70* 0,67* -0,94 -0,93 -0,95 
  (0,37) (0,38) (0,40) (0,58) (0,58) (0,63) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,81 0,81 0,81 0,77 0,78 0,78 
# of cross-sections used 15 15 15 15 15 15 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 280 280 280 271 271 271 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
    Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 16:Regression Results  (Sub-Saharan Africa)          
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,73*** 1,68*** 1,67***    
 (0,25) (0,26) (0,27)    
LNGDPT    2,03*** 1,95*** 2,07*** 
    (0,19) (0,24) (0,25) 
LNRER -1,98*** -1,12*** -1,18*** 0,37* 0,37* 0,49** 
 (0,19) (0,19) (0,21) (0,19) (0,19) (0,22) 
CU  1,29*** 0,77  0,10 42,12 
  (0,13) (1,99)  (0,17) (27,50) 
CULNGDP   0,02    
   (0,09)    
CULNGDPT      -1,62 
      (1,02) 
CULNRER   0,32   -0,76 
      (0,46)     (0,52) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,56 0,62 0,62 0,60 0,60 0,59 
# of cross-sections used 40 40 40 40 40 40 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 483 483 483 408 408 408 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
    Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 17:Regression Results With Crises Periods (Sub-Saharan Africa)        
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,80*** 1,76*** 1,75***    
 (0,26) (0,38) (0,27)    
LNGDPT    2,03*** 1,94*** 2,07*** 
    (0,19) (0,24) (0,25) 
LNRER -2,02*** -1,18*** -1,25*** 0,36* 0,36* 0,48** 
 (0,19) (0,28) (0,21) (0,20) (0,20) (0,22) 
CU  1,28*** 0,88  0,10 43,85 
  (0,19) (2,01)  (0,18) (27,71) 
CULNGDP   0,02    
   (0,09)    
CULNGDPT      -1,69 
      (1,07) 
CULNRER   0,35   -0,76 
   (0,46)   (0,52) 
D1994 -0,64** -0,57 -0,57** -0,19 -0,20 -0,19 
 (0,26) (0,36) (0,25) (0,28) (0,28) (0,28) 
D1999 0,16 0,17 0,18 0,08 0,08 0,11 
 (0,29) (0,39) (0,27) (0,28) (0,28) (0,28) 
D2001 0,35 0,24 0,20 0,17 0,14 0,20 
  (0,62) (0,76) (0,53) (0,50) (0,51) (0,51) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,56 0,62 0,62 0,60 0,59 0,59 
# of cross-sections used 40 40 40 40 40 40 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 483 483 483 408 408 408 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
    Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 20: Regression Results  (Low Income)          
Variables /  LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 1,65*** 0,74*** 1,08***    
 (0,17) (0,17) (0,19)    
LNGDPT    2,27*** 2,14*** 2,32*** 
    (0,14) (0,18) (0,19) 
LNRER -1,22*** -0,75*** -0,95*** 0,29** 0,26** 0,52*** 
 (0,13) (0,14) (0,15) (0,13) (0,13) (0,15) 
CU  1,19*** 7,47***  0,14 26,20 
  (0,10) (1,12)  (0,12) (17,63) 
CULNGDP   -0,28***    
   (0,05)    
CULNGDPT      -1,01 
      (0,68) 
CULNRER   0,79**   -1,28*** 
      (0,34)     (0,33) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,70 0,74 0,75 0,69 0,69 0,69 
# of cross-sections used 51 51 51 53 53 53 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 612 612 612 546 546 546 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 22: Regression Results  (Lower Middle Income)          
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,08*** 1,77*** 1,78***    
 (0,11) (0,13) (0,13)    
LNGDPT    2,33*** 2,15*** 2,27*** 
    (0,13) (0,16) (0,17) 
LNRER -0,26** -0,15 -0,07 0,52*** 0,43** 0,45** 
 (0,10) (0,11) (0,11) (0,13) (0,13) (0,15) 
CU  0,44*** 1,43  0,20** 42,40*** 
  (0,08) (1,05)  (0,09) (13,85) 
CULNGDP   -0,04    
   (0,04)    
CULNGDPT      -1,63*** 
      (0,53) 
CULNRER   -0,46*   -0,38 
      (0,24)     (0,26) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,82 0,83 0,82 
# of cross-sections used 45 45 45 44 44 44 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 568 568 568 525 525 525 
***  reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 23: Regression Results (Lower Middle Income)          
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,01*** 1,73*** 1,74***    
 (0,11) (0,13) (0,13)    
LNGDPT    2,42 2,23*** 2,25*** 
    (10,12) (0,17) (0,18) 
LNRER -0,29** -0,17 -0,09 0,45 0,35** 0,35** 
 (0,11) (0,11) (0,11) (9,73) (0,15) (0,17) 
CU  0,44*** 1,13  0,23* 63,29 
  (0,09) (1,09)  (0,12) (42,28) 
CULNGDP   -0,03    
   (0,05)    
CULNGDPT      -2,43 
      (1,63) 
CULNRER   -0,56**   -0,52* 
   (0,25)   (0,31) 
D1994 0,07 0,22* 0,23* 0,23 0,29* 0,31** 
 (0,10) (0,12) (0,13) (9,93) (0,15) (0,15) 
D1999 0,23** 0,06 -0,04 -0,05 -0,16 -0,36** 
 (0,09) (0,11) (0,12) (9,20) (0,14) (0,17) 
D2001 0,44*** 0,27* 0,32** 0,47 0,33** -0,19 
  (0,15) (0,15) (0,15) (11,08) (0,17) (0,45) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,82 0,83 0,83 
# of cross-sections used 45 45 45 44 44 44 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 568 568 568 525 525 525 
***  reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
     Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 24: Regression Results  (Upper Middle Income) 
Variables / Dependent Variable LXT LXT LXT LMT LMT LMT 
LNGDP 2,68*** 2,60*** 2,64***    
 (0,11) (0,15) (0,15)    
LNGDPT    1,48*** 1,53*** 1,59*** 
    (0,09) (0,11) (0,12) 
LNRER -0,93*** -0,78*** -0,91*** 0,02 0,03 0,10 
 (0,19) (0,20) (0,22) (0,17) (0,17) (0,20) 
CU  0,17 2,24  -0,06 35,15** 
  (0,11) (1,40)  (0,10) (14,98) 
CULNGDP   -0,08    
   (0,06)    
CULNGDPT      -1,36** 
      (0,58) 
CULNRER   0,80*   -0,44 
      (0,48)     (0,37) 
(unweighted statistics) R-bar squared 0,85 0,85 0,85 0,82 0,82 0,82 
# of cross-sections used 27 27 27 26 26 26 
total panel (unbalanced) observations 380 380 380 357 357 357 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**    reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*      reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
    Note: figures in parentheses are standard errors      
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Table 28: Wald Coefficients Tests (Asia) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,44 2,83* 0,093 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=2,15 373,69*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,71 0,96 0,328 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=0,50 0,16 0,694 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     
Table 29: Wald Coefficients Tests (Asia)  (With Crises Periods) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,48 2,41 0,122 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=2,16 373,02*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,68 4,40** 0,037 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=0,62 1,39 0,239 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 32: Wald Coefficients Tests  (Middle East and North Africa) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,84 6,55** 0,011 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=2,07 206,54*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=0,30 0,25 0,616 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=2,07 2,22 0,137 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     
Table 33: Wald Coefficients Tests  (Middle East and North Africa)  (With Crises Periods) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,72 4,50** 0,035 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=2,09 208,07*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,08 0,02 0,892 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=1,23 0,72 0,396 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 34: Wald Coefficients Tests (Sub-Saharan Africa) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,86 4,20** 0,041 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=1,69 38,72*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,27 0,3 0,585 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=0,45 0,18 0,669 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     
Table 35: Wald Coefficients Tests  (Sub-Saharan Africa)  (With Crises Periods) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,90 4,45** 0,035 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=1,77 41,67*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,28 0,33 0,565 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=0,38 0,13 0,715 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 36: Wald Coefficients Tests (High-Income) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,66 8,46 0,004 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=1,70 764,58*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,08 0,35 0,555 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=1,18 30,34*** 0,000 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     
Table 37: Wald Coefficients Tests (High-Income) (With Crises Periods) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,89 15,34*** 0,000 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=1,69 771,36*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,12 0,48 0,486 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=1,40 3,55* 0,060 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 38: Wald Coefficients Tests (Low Income) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,16 0,27 0,604 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=0,80 21,39*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,76 7,94*** 0,005 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=1,31 4,10** 0,043 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     
Table 39: Wald Coefficients Tests (Low Income) (With Crises Periods) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,22 0,48 0,490 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=0,84 24,35*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,53 2,71 0,100 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=1,80 1,15 0,283 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 40: Wald Coefficients Tests (Lower Middle Income) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,53 5,20** 0,023 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=1,74 173,98*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=0,07 0,11 0,737 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=0,64 1,58 0,209 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     
Table 41: Wald Coefficients Tests (Lower Middle Income) (With Crises Periods) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,65 7,31*** 0,007 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=1,71 163,42*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,17 0,36 0,549 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=-0,18 0,01 0,914 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 42: Wald Coefficients Tests  (Upper Middle Income) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,11 0,06 0,800 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=2,56 278,11*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,34 1,03 0,311 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=0,23 0,17 0,682 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
     
     
Table 43: Wald Coefficients Tests  (Upper Middle Income) (With Crises Periods) 
Model Null Hypothesis Coefficient Sums F-Statistic Probability 
export lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,35 0,56 0,454 
 lngdp+culngdp=0 lngdp+culngdp=2,48 250,82*** 0,000 
     
import lnrer+culnrer=0 lnrer+culnrer=-0,51 1,93 0,165 
  lngdpT+culngdpT=0 lngdpT+culngdpT=0,55 0,09 0,758 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
**   reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
*     reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
 
 
 
